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Abstract
Unemployment duration is critical when evaluating economic policies. In my dissertation,
I examine: i) the gender differences in unemployment duration, ii) the effects of housing tenure
on unemployment duration, and iii) the differences in determinants of unemployment between East
and West Germans. Despite the evidence of gender differences in duration of unemployment, its
determinants remain not well understood. This paper aims to address the gap in the literature
on determinants of unemployment by studying the differences in unemployment duration between
genders and within-gender groups of East and West Germans. I construct unemployment spells from
the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1990–2011 to shed more light on the differentials and their
association with a partner and children. A simple comparison of median durations and survival
functions shows that women’s unemployment spells are twice as long as men’s, and that these
differences nearly triple during the child–bearing and –rearing ages, regardless of location. I find
that the differences in unemployment duration between genders are associated with the presence
of young children and a partner. Women’s unemployment hazard rates are between 40 and 80
percentage points lower in the presence of children aged 0–4 than comparable men’s hazard rates.
In addition, West German men and women have hazard rates 20 and 25 percentage points lower than
comparable East Germans, even after controlling for non-labor income. I find that the differential
in unemployment duration between Eastern and Western females is associated with the differential
effect of young children and a partner. These findings are robust after accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity.
Homeownership is associated with positive outcomes such as urban sprawl, enacting zoning
laws, and lowering crime rates, but there is also evidence of homeownership reducing labor mobility.
This paper examines the effects of homeownership on unemployment lengths in Germany. I use
unemployment spells from the German-Socio Economic Panel for the period 1990–2011 to estimate
ii
the effect of homeownership on unemployment length while controlling for possible self-selection
into homeownership. The data suggests that homeowners experience two months shorter duration
of unemployment which translates to a 13 percent higher rate of exits from unemployment after con-
trolling for observables. However, after controlling for self-selection into homeownership, I find that
homeownership significantly decreases the exit rate out of unemployment by 56 percent compared
to renters.
Since the unification of East and West Germany, East Germany underwent economic and
institutional transitions which were followed by soaring and persistent unemployment. Previous lit-
erature shows that there are tenacious differences between East and West Germans in unemployment
duration and its determinants during first nine years after unification. In this paper, I use the data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel to shed light on the differences in duration of unemployment
and its determinants for 1990–2012 period. My findings show that there are differences between East
and West Germans in unemployment duration and its determinants, in particular, education and
age, during the early periods of transition. Easterners have shorter spells of unemployment, and
the difference is especially large during longer spells. However, I find that these differences disap-
pear over time. In addition, I find evidence of an emergence of the educational differential between
East and West Germans with a higher levels of education shortening East German unemployment
duration more than West German unemployment durations.
iii
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Chapter 1
Explaining Gender Differences in
Unemployment Duration:
Evidence from Reunified Germany
1.1 Introduction
Understanding unemployment duration is critical when evaluating economic policies such as
unemployment, especially in countries with extensive safety nets. Previous literature focuses on the
effects of unemployment insurance on unemployment duration.1 Furthermore, the evidence shows
that longer unemployment lengths have long-term negative effects on future outcomes (Ruhm, 1991;
Raphael and Ebmer, 2001, Arulampalam; 2001; Mroz and Savage, 2006), and that females experience
longer unemployment spells than males (Podgursky and Swaim, 1987; Farber et al., 1997; Abbring
et al., 2002; Keltzer and Fairlie, 2003; Hu and Taber, 2011). Recent empirical evidence sheds some
light on the gender differential in duration being associated with the presence of young children in
the U.S. (Kunze and Troske, 2012), but this differential is still not well understood.
In this paper, I study differences in unemployment duration between genders, as well as
1These are some examples of literature studying the effects of the unemployment insurance on duration for the
U.S.: Meyer (1990), Katz and Meyer (1990), Card and Levine (2000); for Europe: Hunt (1995), Røed and Zhang
(2003), Lalive (2008), van Ours and Vodopivec (2006), Card et al. (2007), Caliendo et al. (2013), Card et al. (2015).
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within-gender differences between East and West Germans.2 I use periods after reunification when
safety nets and other formal institutions have been homogenized between East and West Germany.
This guarantees that differences in the welfare state and other formal institutions are not responsible
for any observed differential in unemployment duration between East and West Germans. Existing
evidence indicates differences in post-unified labor market outcomes between East and West Germans
such as wages, likelihood of employment, or receiving a college degree (Krueger and Pischke, 1992;
Hunt, 2002; Hunt, 2004; Riphahn and Tru¨bswetter, 2013; Mesella and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2015).
Thus, in this paper I explore whether duration of unemployment is different between East and West
Germans.
In Section 1.2, I describe the construction of the sample and perform a preliminary analysis
of gender and within-gender differences in unemployment duration. I construct unemployment spell
data using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for 1991–2011. The first advantage of the
GSOEP over official German administrative data is the ability to identify a location of origin prior
to reunification. The second advantage of my data set is the availability of information on non-
labor income (including public transfers and partners’ wages), as well as data on the presence of
spouses and young children, which might be associated with the differential in unemployment length
between genders. My sample consists of individuals in their prime working years, ages 18–55, from
the moment they transition to unemployment until the time at which they either exit unemployment
to work or are censored. The prime–age workers are more similar with respect to decisions affecting
their job search than, for example, workers reentering the labor market after inactivity, workers
coming out of education, or workers preparing to end their working life.
I find that female unemployment spells are longer than male spells. The median duration of
unemployment for females is 14 months, compared to 7 months for males. Examining duration across
age cohorts indicates that the largest difference in duration of unemployment between genders is
during the childbearing and childrearing ages (25–35). Furthermore, female median durations are up
to three times longer in the presence of young children when compared to either male durations with
children or childless female durations. In addition, I find that both East German males and females
have median durations shorter by one month than comparable West Germans of the same gender.
For East and West German males, the median durations within and across age cohorts are similar,
while I find that East German females have shorter median durations than West German females
2I identify whether an individual is East or West German by domicile in 1989, just prior to reunification.
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across all age cohorts. However, I find that the difference in unemployment durations between East
and West German females are only significant during childbearing and childrearing ages. These
findings indicate that the gender differences in unemployment duration might be related to the role
of children, and that the role of children might not be the same across East and West Germans.
In Section 1.3, I present my empirical strategy that examines the differentials in the duration
of unemployment while taking into account the role of other determinants, such as non-labor income
or local labor market conditions. My empirical model is based on Mortensen’s (1986) seminal work
on job search, where the probability of exiting unemployment is a product of the probability of
receiving a job offer and the probability of then accepting that job offer. Since my primary interest
is the effects of determinants, I use the Extended Cox model to estimate effects of a partner and
children on the probability of leaving unemployment while controlling for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity, as well as censoring.3 This semi-parametric hazard model is a reasonable compromise
between the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric model, and the possibly excessively structured parametric
models. Additionally, I use time-varying explanatory variables to relax restrictive assumptions about
the proportionality between hazards in the Cox Proportional Hazard model.
In Section 1.4, I present estimates for the differences in unemployment between genders
and between East and West Germans. I find individuals older than 46 have significantly lower
hazards regardless of gender, while the differential in unemployment duration between genders is
only present in age groups 18–25, 26–30 and 31–35. Females in these cohorts are approximately
35, 37, and 32 percentage points less likely to leave unemployment than comparable males, ceteris
paribus. However, this differential between genders during ages 18–35 ceases to exist after I control
for the presence of children and a partner. I find that females with children ages 0–1 and ages 2–4
have hazards which are 80 and 40 percentage points lower, respectively, than those of comparable
males. In addition, I find that females have lower hazards in the presence of a partner regardless of
the partner’s employment status.
The results also indicate that East German males and females have probabilities of leaving
unemployment spells that are 20 and 25 percentage points higher, respectively, than West Germans
of the same gender. Furthermore, the results show that these gaps are not due to the differences
in non-labor income. My estimates indicate that 22 percent of the gap in unemployment hazards
between East and West German females is due to the presence of children ages 2–4 in the household.
3The Extended and the Proportional Cox models differ in that former allows time–varying regressors.
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After controlling for the presence of a partner and young children in the household, I find that the
gap between unemployment hazards of East and West German males diminishes; however, I find
that the effects of these determinants are not significantly different between East and West German
males.
Duration models are sensitive to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, which can con-
tribute to negative duration dependence (Heckman and Singer, 1984b). In my main results, the
baseline is allowed to vastly vary with individual unemployment duration which accounts for some
heterogeneity between individuals. In addition, in Section 1.5, I check the robustness of the main
results to the presence of individual unobserved heterogeneity. I estimate the Extended Cox model
with a flexible baseline, and I assume that the unobserved heterogeneity follows the Gaussian distri-
bution. Estimates indicate that my main results are robust to the presence of individual unobserved
heterogeneity.
A possible explanation for the difference in unemployment duration between the genders
is in female comparative advantage in childbearing and childrearing (Becker, 1993). The presence
of young children could either increase female reservation wages or reduce search intensities. Con-
sequently, the duration of female unemployment is expected to vary with age, i.e. female duration
of unemployment rises during childbearing and childrearing years, and falls afterward. Alternative
explanations for the difference in unemployment duration between the genders are discrimination
and productivity differences (Black, 1995; Bowlus, 1997; Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002). These expla-
nations imply that the gender differential in unemployment duration persists across age groups, and
that it does not disappear after controlling for children. My estimates, on the other hand, provide
evidence suggesting that the differential in unemployment duration between genders is driven by the
division of labor in the household.
Finding a differential effect of young children in the duration of unemployment between
East and West German females could be due to differential investment in early childhood human
capital. The Becker et al. (2015) model of intergenerational transmission of human capital predicts
that wealthier households invest more in their children’s human capital. If investment in children’s
human capital is associated with the female length of unemployment during early childhood of their
children, then females from wealthier households have either higher reservation wages or lower search
intensities, and consequently have longer unemployment spells.
East Germans are considerably worse off economically. For example, the East German
4
average annual wage in 1993 was e10,740, compared to e15,892 in West Germany; in 2011, the
average East German wage was e14,536 and the average West German wage was e17,113.4 The
economic differences between East and West Germans are even wider if one compares the net worth
of average East Germans (e76,000) and West Germans (e153,000) (Connolly, 2015).
I contribute to the literature in three ways. First, I show that the gender differences in
unemployment durations vary with age in both East and West Germany and that these differences
are associated with the presence of children and a partner. This distinguishes my paper from Kunze
and Troske (2012), who only show that the gender differences in unemployment duration vary across
age cohorts in West Germany. This also contributes to the literature studying differences in labor
market outcomes between genders. Second, in the context of unemployment duration literature,
I show strong evidence of fertility decisions being another source of variation in unemployment
durations, in addition to unemployment insurance. Third, my findings that a partner and young
children have differential effects on East and West German durations of unemployment contribute
to the literature on differences in labor outcomes between Germans. Finally, I provide concluding
remarks in Section 1.6.
4These wages are calculated using the wages for full-time employed workers from entire GSOEP sample, and are
in real 2005 e.
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1.2 Unemployment Duration in Germany
1.2.1 Data
I use data on unemployment spells from the German Socio–Economic Panel (GSOEP) which
collects data on households and individuals in Germany annually. In 1984, the survey began by
collecting data on 4,500 households in West Germany, and in 1990, the survey expanded its scope
to East Germany by including an additional 2,179 households. As of the 2011 update, the survey
included 12,290 households and 21,069 individuals.5 The GSOEP contains a large array of socio-
economic variables including information on children’s age, partners’ wages, and non-labor income,
which are not available in administrative data. Additionally, it follows individuals through their
employment biographies, and can distinguish between East and West Germans by their residence
during 1989, just before reunification. In addition, I collect data on job vacancies and registered
unemployed individuals at the state-yearly level from the Federal Statistics Office (Statistisches
Bundesamt).
I use data for the period 1991–2011 to construct unemployment spells. The GSOEP survey
asks two types of labor questions: contemporaneous and retrospective. In a monthly calendar
section individuals retrospectively declare their labor status for each month in the previous year. I
construct unemployment spells using this part of the survey. In the contemporaneous part of the
survey, individuals provide information on the exact date when they lost their last job during the
previous year or during the survey year. I use this information to cross-reference beginnings of the
constructed spells. After cross-referencing the dates, I obtain a sample of 9,321 spells for 5,817
individuals, of which 57 percent are female spells. There are 4,509 East German spells, of which 52
percent are female spells, and 4,812 West German spells, of which 61 percent are female spells.6
According to the International Labor Organization’s 1982 definition of unemployment, a
person is considered to be unemployed if he or she is without employment while currently available
and seeking work. Unfortunately, the GSOEP does not collect information on a person’s availability
for work or whether the person is actively looking for a job on a monthly basis. To circumvent
this problem, I examine the spells of individuals in their prime working age (18–55) who entered
unemployment either from employment (95 percent of spells) or after completing an apprenticeship
5For further information about the GSOEP, see Rahmann and Schupp (2013).
6My sample contains only individuals who are born in Germany.
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education (5 percent of spells), since these individuals are most likely to be available and looking
for work.
In Table 1.1, I provide an overview of the spells by location and gender (West German
males, West German females, East German males, East German females). I use the Kaplan and
Meier (1958) estimator to estimate median durations, i.e. the time until which at least half of the
spells end in an exit from unemployment. Male median unemployment lengths are approximately
two times shorter than female median durations, regardless of location. There are differences in
the types of exits from unemployment between genders and between East and Wester Germans.
The East German male share of unemployment spells ending in full-time employment is 95 percent,
exceeding the West German male, East German female, and West German female shares by 6, 28,
and 57 percentage points (respectively). Similarly, the East German male share of unemployment
spells ending in part-time employment is approximately 5 percent, which is lower than the West
German male, East German female, and West German female shares by 5, 27, and 56 percentage
points (respectively).
Additionally, an individual in my sample can have more than one spell of unemployment.
I find that 36 percent and 33 percent of West German male and female individuals (respectively)
have more than one spell. In contrast, 49 percent and 45 percent of East German male and female
individuals (respectively) have more than one spell. In summary, Table 1.1 indicates the drastic
differences in length of unemployment and types of exits from unemployment between genders. Men
enjoy shorter spells of unemployment and are more likely to return to full-time employment. East
Germans are more likely to have multiple spells of unemployment with shorter durations, and East
German females are considerably more likely to return to full-time employment than West German
females.
1.2.2 Demographic Characteristics
In Table 1.2, columns 3–4 and 7–8, I present the composition of unemployment spells by
demographic characteristics for West and East Germans. I find that variation in age at which indi-
viduals enter unemployment is similar between West German males and females, with approximately
60 percent of the spells originating before age 36 for both genders. However, there are differences
between West German males and females in the distribution of spells across the three youngest age
groups. There are 31.4 percent, 15.5 percent, and 14.8 percent of West German male spells in age
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groups 18–25, 26–30, and 31–35 (respectively), while 20.4 percent, 19.6 percent, and 20.1 percent of
West German female spells are in the same age groups (respectively). In contrast, 49 percent and 53
percent of East German male and female spells (respectively) begin before age 36. I also note that
the distribution of spells within each age cohort is much smaller between East German males and
females, especially for those younger than 36. The comparison of the sample within gender across
age groups for East and West Germans indicates that there are more spells starting at later ages in
East Germany than in West Germany for both males and females.
During their unemployment spells, West German males are predominately childless or have
a child older than seven, accounting for 74 percent of their spells. In contrast, West German females
more often have a child during their unemployment spells. There is a child younger than eight in
55 percent of West German female spells, while there is a child younger than five in 44 percent of
spells. East German males are also predominately childless or have a child older than seven during
unemployment spells, accounting for 72 percent of their spells. East German females have a child
younger than eight in 44 percent of their spells, while in 33 percent of their spells is there a child
younger than five. A comparison of children indicators within genders and across locations shows
that in 72 percent and 74 percent of East and West (respectively) German male spells, the males are
childless or have a child older than seven. A similar comparison between females indicates that 33
percent and 44 percent of East and West (respectively) German female spells include a child younger
than five, while there is a child younger than eight in 44 percent and 55 percent (respectively) of
spells.
During unemployment spells, East and West German males are more likely to be single
than East and West German females. Furthermore, an employed spouse is present in 34 percent
and 67 percent of West German male and female (respectively) spells; in 21 percent and 7 percent
of West German male and female (respectively) spells, the partner is also unemployed. In contrast,
an employed spouse is present in 43 percent and 61 percent of East German male and female
(respectively) spells; in 23 percent and 13 percent of East German male and female (respectively)
spells, the partner is also unemployed. In terms of education, West German males have equal or
lower educational levels than an apprenticeship in 56 percent of spells, while West German females
have 35 percent of spells in the same categories. In contrast to the West, East German males have
equal or lower educational levels than an apprenticeship in 29 percent of spells, while East German
females have 19 percent of spells in the same categories.
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In summary, a typical West German male spell in my sample would originate during ages
18–25 while the individual is single and childless. In contrast, a typical West German female spell
would originate during ages 18–35 while the individual is in a relationship with an employed partner
and has a child younger than eight. Similarly, a typical East German male spell would originate
during ages 18–25 while the individual is childless but in a relationship with an employed partner.
A typical East German female spell would originate during ages 18–25 while the individual has a
child younger than eight and is in a relationship with an employed spouse.
1.2.3 Differences in Duration of Unemployment
In Table 1.2, I further examine differences in unemployment durations between genders
and between East and West Germans by demographics. Columns 1–2 and 5–6 summarize median
durations of unemployment for genders by location of origin. I present median durations as summary
statistics, while I use the Peto and Peto (1972) and Prentice (1978) log-rank test (henceforward the
Peto-Peto-Prentice test) to examine statistical differences in survivor functions between genders and
between East and West Germans.7 Additionally, I estimate survivor functions, i.e. the probability
that an individual stays in unemployment for another month, using the Kaplan and Meier (1958)
estimator.
First, I compare the median unemployment durations by seven age groups. In columns 1
and 2, the median durations show that West German males have shorter spells than West German
females at any age. I also note two patterns for West Germans: first, median durations increase
after age 50 for both genders; and second, only female median durations increase during childbearing
and childrearing ages (26–35). In columns 5 and 6, I compare East German males and females and
observe similar patterns as between West Germans, with the exception of East German males. I find
that East German males only experience a one-month increase in duration after age 50 (compared to
a 6-month increase for West German males). In figures 1.1 and 1.2, I plot the survival functions for
both genders within each age cohort. I compare these survivor functions using the Peto-Peto-Prentice
test and I find that females have significantly higher survivor functions than males, regardless of age
or location.
I also compare the median durations and survivor functions within gender across locations.
7Unlike other log-rank tests of equality between survivor functions, the Peto-Peto-Prentice’s log-rank test is appro-
priate even when hazards do not vary proportionally and the test is not affected by differences in censoring patterns
across groups. All the comparisons of the survival functions are performed at a 5% significance level.
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East and West German males have similar median durations of unemployment for all age cohorts
except for the oldest group. In the oldest cohort, West German male durations exceed East German
male durations by six months. However, I find that the differences between East and West males are
only significant for age groups 31–35 and 51–55. In contrast to male durations, East German female
median durations are lower than the West German female durations for all age groups except ages
18–25, where the median durations are same. Nevertheless, the Peto-Peto-Prentice test shows that
differences between East and West German females are only statistically significant for age groups
26–30 and 31–35.
Second, I compare the median durations and survivor functions between genders in the pres-
ence of children. In column 1, West German females have 22 month-long and 18 month-long median
durations in the presence of children ages 2–4 and 5–7 (respectively) which exceed West German
male median durations by 15 months and 12 months (respectively); see column 2. Similarly, in col-
umn 5, East German females with children 2–4 and 5–7 have median durations of 15 months and 14
months (respectively) which exceed East German male durations by 10 and 9 months (respectively);
see column 6. A comparison of survivor functions between genders in both East and West Germany
shows that these differences are significant. Although the differences in median durations between
genders in the presence of children older than seven or without children are small in both East and
West Germany, the comparison of survivor functions shows that these differences are significant.
I compare East German median durations to West German durations within gender and
across children indicators. I find no significant difference in survivor functions between East and
West German male survivor functions for any of the variables indicating the presence of the children.
In contrast to males, I find that the West German female median durations exceed the East German
female median durations by 7 months and 4 months for children’s age groups 2–4 and 5–7 (respec-
tively), and the differences between corresponding survivor functions are significant. Additionally,
I find no significant difference in survivor functions between East and West German males with
children older than seven or without children. A similar comparison for females shows that East
German females with children older than seven or without children have a longer median duration
than comparable West German females, but these differences are only significant for females without
children.
Third, I compare median durations and corresponding survival functions between genders in
East and West Germany by relationship status. I find no difference in median durations or survivor
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functions between single West German males and females, while I find significant differences between
married West German males and females, regardless of their partner’s employment status. For
example, West German female median durations are 17 months and 21 months in the presence of
an employed and an unemployed partner (respectively), which exceeds West German male median
durations by 12 months and 15 months (respectively). In contrast to West Germans, I find significant
differences in survivor functions between genders in East Germany, regardless of relationship status.
For example, East German married females have median durations of 13 months and 16 months in
the presence of an employed and an unemployed partner (respectively), and these exceed comparable
East German male durations by 9 months in the presence of both an employed and an unemployed
partner.
The East-West comparison of median durations and survivor functions within genders shows
that married East German females have a shorter median duration than married West German
females, regardless of their partner’s employment status. In contrast, single West German females
have a shorter median duration than single East German females. Nevertheless, the Peto-Peto-
Prentice test shows that the differences in survivor functions are significant between single East and
West German females, as well as between married East and West German females with an employed
partner. A similar comparison between East and West German males shows significant differences
in duration only between married individuals with an employed partner. The median unemployment
duration is longer for all groups if both partners are unemployed. This might be related to public
transfers that are determined on the household level.
Fourth, I compare unemployment durations between genders across education levels. In
columns 1 and 2, I find that West German males have shorter median durations than West German
females for any education level, but the difference in median duration between genders falls with
higher levels of education. For example, West German males with an apprenticeship degree have
a median duration of eight months, which is seven months shorter than the comparable median
duration for West German females. The difference in median durations between genders in West
Germany is smallest for holders of tertiary degrees. The comparison of survivor functions between
genders in West Germany shows that these differences in duration are significant for each educational
level. The differences in median durations and survivor functions between genders in East Germany
are similar to the West German differences. An exception is for East Germans with an incomplete
degree, since there seems to be no significant difference in survivor functions between males and
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females.
Finally, I compare within-gender East-West differences across education levels. I find that
East German males have shorter median durations than West German males, with the exception
of those with incomplete degrees. The comparison of survivor functions between East and West
German males indicates that these differences in duration are only significant for those with an
incomplete degree. In contrast to males, I find that East German females have shorter median
durations than West German females only for levels of education higher than an apprenticeship.
The comparison of survivor functions indicates that the differences in duration are only significant
between East and West Germans with secondary education.
1.2.4 Differences in Non-Labor Income
In Table 1.3, I present summary statistics for non-labor income by location of origin and
gender, as well as their differences and corresponding standard errors. I include the following mea-
sures of non-labor income: income assets, public transfers, and partner’s wages. All three variables
are recorded yearly, and the first two variables are reported at a household level. Income assets in-
clude yearly income from interest, dividends, and rent, while public transfers include yearly income
received from the government by all individuals in the household as well as benefits received at the
household level.8
I find significant differences in non-labor income between genders in both West and East
Germany. In both regions, females have on average higher non-labor income from income assets
during their unemployment spells, whereas males on average receive more in public transfers. Ad-
ditionally, during a female’s unemployment spell, her partner on average earns more in wages than
a male’s partner. For example, West German females’ partners will earn e19,171 more than West
German males’ partners. Similarly, East German females’ partners earn e7,172 more than East
German males’ partners. These comparisons indicate that the female durations might be extended
because females have significantly higher non-labor income, especially in terms of a spouse’s wages.
Thus, females might have higher reservation wages or lower search intensities than males.
Additionally, I make comparisons within genders between East and West Germans. I find
8Individual benefits include student grants, maternity benefits, unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance,
subsistence allowances, and transition pay over all individuals in the household. Household benefits include housing
allowances, child benefits, nursing care insurance, direct housing subsidies, subsistence assistance, support for special
circumstances, social assistance for elderly, and benefits from the ”unemployment benefit II” program.
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that East Germans have significantly lower non-labor income than West Germans. For example,
average asset income of an East German male is approximately e336–three times lower than the
amount from asset income of a West German male, but the difference in the variation of income from
assets is eight times larger in West. East German males also receive on average e9,453 in public
transfers, and this exceeds West males’ public transfers by e500. West German males’ partners
earn on average e6,367, which exceeds East German males’ partners’ wages by e1,206. A similar
comparison of average non-labor income for East and West German females shows the same trend as
for males, but with larger differences. On average, West German females receive e1,739 in non-labor
income from assets, which exceeds East German females’ averages by e1,268. East German females
receive on average e8,401 in public transfers during their spells of unemployment, which exceeds
West German females’ public transfers by e2,452. Also, the average West German female partner’s
wage is e25,538 which is approximately two times larger than East female’s partner’s wage. Hence,
the East Germans duration of unemployment might be shorter because their non-labor income is
significantly lower than West Germans which means that either their reservation wages are lower or
their search intensity is higher.
1.2.5 Differences in Labor Market Conditions
Besides the role of non-labor income in unemployment duration, local labor market con-
ditions are important factors for unemployment length. I use a measure of labor market tightness
and average real state wages at the yearly level to control for labor market conditions. Using the
data from the Federal Statistics Office in Germany, I construct a measure of labor market tightness,
a ratio of the number of job vacancies to the number of unemployed individuals. In Figure 1.3, I
plot labor market tightness for East and West Germany. The figure indicates that labor market
conditions are better in West Germany than in East Germany. Additionally, the figure indicates
that local labor conditions in East and West Germany move together, but the gap between them
does not shrink over time. Finally, the figure indicates that local labor market conditions began
improving around 2005 in both East and West Germany.
In addition, I construct average real state wages as another control of local labor market
conditions in Germany. I use real wages of full-time employed individuals from the entire GSOEP
to construct average state wages. In Figure 1.4, I plot densities of wages for four periods: 1990–
1995, 1996–2000, 2001–2005. and 2006–2010. The figure shows that average wages are significantly
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lower in East Germany during the first period, and that over time the East German wage converges
towards the West German wage. I also note that the variance in average wages is increasing over
time.
In summary, I find that females have a 14 month-long median duration of unemployment,
which is two times longer than the median duration for males. East Germans have shorter dura-
tions than West Germans by a month. A decomposition of median durations across demographic
characteristics shows that the differences between genders are largest during the childbearing and
childrearing ages. In addition, gender differences are enlarged up to three times in the presence of
young children. I also find that gender differences in unemployment durations between genders are
smaller in East Germany than in West Germany.
One reason for the smaller differences in unemployment duration between genders in East
Germany may be due to significantly lower non-labor income, which translates into lower reservation
wages. However, the measures of labor market conditions show that East Germans are faced with
a significantly tighter labor market than West Germans. Consequently, I would expect that East
Germans are less likely to receive a job offer, which extends their unemployment durations. Thus,
the difference in median durations and survivor functions between genders and between East and
West Germans might be due to the lack of controls for factors such as non-labor income or local
labor market conditions. In the next section, I use the Extended Cox model to see whether these
differences in duration persist after controlling for other variables.
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1.3 Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 The Job Search Model
The foundation of my empirical model is the Mortensen (1986) job search model. In the
model, risk-neutral individuals look for a job while facing exogenous labor market conditions. Dur-
ing each period, an unemployed person receives a job offer with some probability. The job offer
comes with a wage offer, which is identically and independently drawn from a known distribution
function, F (w). Given these assumptions, Mortensen (1986) shows that the optimal search strat-
egy is characterized by a reservation wage, wR, which depends on unemployment benefits, search
costs, the discount rate, the probability of receiving a job offer (i.e. the contact rate), and the wage
distribution function. Although Mortensen’s (1986) model refers to the wage offer as a monetary
reward, it could be generalized to capture some measure of the desirability of the job, such as the
benefits, location, prestige, etc. Furthermore, the model’s definition of unemployment benefits can
be expanded to include the value of leisure or home production.9 Comparative statics show that
wR increases with the value of benefits and decreases with an increasing discount rate or increasing
search costs (Mortensen, 1986).
Mortensen’s (1986) model also implies that in a two-state (employment and unemployment)
labor market, the probability of leaving unemployment (or the unemployment hazard) is a function
of the probability of receiving a job offer and the probability of accepting an offer that has been
made.10 Let the duration of unemployment be represented by a positive continuous random variable
T . Then the unemployment hazard for an individual i at time t, λi(t), is defined by
λi(t) := lim
h→0+
Pr(t+ h > Ti > t|Ti > t)
h
(1.1)
I parameterize person i’s hazard λi(t) as a function of a baseline hazard λ0(t) and a function of
regressors x and parameters β, φ(xt, β), where x can be either time-constant or time-varying.
11
9See Rogerson et al. (2005) for a survey of search-theoretical models of labor markets.
10This reduced-form model implies that the total effects of the variables on the unemployment hazard are estimated
rather than the distinct effects on the reservation wage and the probability of receiving a job offer. Thus, while this
is not a direct test of search theory, it does have the advantage of not imposing further restrictive distributional
assumptions required for structural analysis.
11The most common choice of φ(xt, β) is the exponential form, which permits coefficients to be easily interpreted
and ensures φ(xt, β) > 0.
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Thus, the hazard function is
λi(t|xt, β) = λ0(t) φ(xit, β) (1.2)
Duration models are sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity, which can bias the estimated hazard
toward negative duration dependence if ignored, as shown by Heckman and Singer (1984b); this
means that the probability of leaving unemployment will appear to be lower than it is. In this paper,
I control for unobserved heterogeneity in two distinct ways. First, the Extended Cox model allows
the baseline to be vastly different across unemployment durations thereby controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity.12 Second, I introduce an individual’s unobserved heterogeneity, θi, as a random
variable independent of regressors xi(t) and which enters the unemployment hazard multiplicatively,
so that
λi(t|xt, β, θi) = λ0(ti) φ(xit, β) θi (1.3)
The model in (1.3) is identified if variation in observed survival times can be uniquely decomposed
by contributions of the covariates, unobserved heterogeneity, and the duration dependence.13 One
must either make an assumption about the shape of the distribution µ(θ) or use Heckman and
Singer’s (1984b) methodology to avoid the distributional assumption for µ(θ). I use Meyer’s (1990)
methodology to estimate a discrete-time version of the Cox model with the baseline specified as a
piecewise constant function, i.e. a dummy for each month of unemployment.14 I also assume that
unobserved heterogeneity, θ, follows the Gaussian distribution. Nicolettia and Rondinelli (2010)
show that if the normality assumption for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution is incorrect,
then neither the duration dependence nor the covariate coefficient estimation is biased.
1.3.2 Estimation
My hypothesis is that unemployment hazard varies differently between genders during a
woman’s childbearing and childrearing years. I use variations of the hazard function (1.2) to test
12This estimator is somewhat similar to Chamberlain’s estimator for the logit model with panel data in that a
conditioning operation is used to remove the heterogeneity (Green, 2012).
13See Melino and Sueyoshi (1990) for the conditions and proof of identifiability.
14Meyer (1990) shows that complementary log-log model (cloglog) is equivalent to the discrete-time version of the
Cox model.
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whether unemployment hazards vary with age differently between genders, and to test whether the
differences in unemployment hazards between genders are associated with the presence of young
children and a partner. Thus, I specify the hazard function as
λi(t|Xβ) = λg(t) exp
[
~agei ~α+ ~kidsi(t) ~γ + ~partneri(t) ~δ + femalei ∗ ~agei ~ζ
+femalei ∗ ~kidsi(t) ~η + femalei ∗ ~partneri(t) ~θ + ~Zi(t) ~µ
] (1.4)
where g = {male, female}, and ~agei is a vector of time-invariant indicators determining the age
group at which an individual enters unemployment; female is an indicator of an individual’s gender;
kidsi(t) is a vector of time-varying dummy variables indicating the presence of children in a specific
age cohort; partner is a vector of indicators determining a partner’s employment status. The set of
regressors in Zi(t) includes personal controls (partner’s employment status, education, public trans-
fers, income assets, partner’s real wage), and variables for local labor conditions (average real wage,
labor market tightnesses), state and year fixed effects. In (1.4), I allow the baseline λg(t) to differ
across genders. In this specification, the coefficients of interest are ~ζ, ~η, and ~θ, which indicate the
differences in unemployment hazards within age groups between genders, the differences in unem-
ployment hazards between genders in the presence of children, and the differences in unemployment
hazards between genders in the presence of a partner (respectively).
I also test whether the differences in unemployment hazards between East and West Germans
are associated with the presence of young children. In order to test the hypothesis, I specify the
hazard function as
λgi (t|X,β) = λg(t) exp
[
westi α
g + ~kidsi(t) ~γg + ~partneri(t) ~δ
g
+west ∗ ~kidsi(t) ~ζg + west ∗ ~partneri(t) ~ηg + ~Zi(t) ~µg
] (1.5)
where g = {male, female}, and west is a dummy variable equal to one if an individual lived in West
Germany during 1989 (just prior to reunification), and zero otherwise. In this specification, I allow
the baseline hazard λg(t) and the effect of covariates to differ across genders. The main coefficients
of interest are αg, ~ζg, and ~ηg, which capture the conditional difference in unemployment hazards
within genders between East and West Germans, the difference in unemployment hazards between
East and West Germans due to children, and the difference in unemployment hazards between East
and West Germans due to a partner (respectively).
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I use the Cox (1972, 1975) partial likelihood method to estimate coefficients in (1.4) – (1.5).
The hazard functions are semi-parametric, since the baselines remain unspecified. The Cox model
is a series of comparisons of those subjects who leave unemployment to those subjects who are
in unemployment; I informally refer to the latter set as the risk set. Thus, the partial likelihood
largely depends on the order of events. When there are multiple exits from unemployment during
the same instance, referred to as a tie, one must decide how to calculate the risk sets for these tied
observations. Because the data on unemployment are collected on a monthly level, there are multiple
exits from unemployment during the same month of unemployment, or multiple ties. I use Efron’s
(1977) method to correct for the presence of ties.15 In both specifications, the effects of covariates
are modeled parametrically as a multiplicative effect on the hazard, and the effects of covariates are
independent of the baseline in both specifications.
In the estimation, I assume that an unemployment spell is a random draw. I obtain standard
errors via bootstrap with 1000 replications, and I cluster standard errors to account for the possibility
of an individual having more than one spell. Because the Extended Cox Model estimates relative
risk between groups, I report hazard ratios (exponentiated coefficients), which can be interpreted as
a change in the hazard at time t when the variables are increased by one unit. For interpretation,
a hazard ratio (HR) greater than one indicates a shortening of the spells of unemployment as a
covariate increases, and a HR less than one indicates an extension of the spells as a covariate
increases.16
15Efron (1977) outperforms the Breslow and the Kalbfleisch-Prentice methods (see: Hertz-Picciotto and Rockhill,
1997); at same time, it is significantly less computationally demanding than exact marginal-likelihood methods.
16HR = exp[b], HR>1 if b>0, and HR<1 if b<0.
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1.4 Main Results
1.4.1 Gender Differences in Unemployment Duration
In Table 1.4, I report estimation results from the Extend Cox model specified in (1.4). First,
I present regression results without controls for the presence of children or a partner in column 1. I
then sequentially include dummies for children and a partner as well as their interactions with the
indicator female in columns 2 and 3 (respectively). I control for education, non-labor income, local
labor market conditions, and year-state fixed effects in all three specifications. I find that higher
levels of education are associated with significantly higher hazard rates across specifications. In
addition, I find that partner’s wage and public transfers significantly decrease the hazard rates, and
that the local labor market tightness has a negative significant effect on the hazards.
Analysis of median durations and survivor functions shows marginal differences in durations
of unemployment between men across age cohorts. In contrast, the estimates in column 1 of Table
1.4 indicate that men ages 26–40 have higher unemployment hazards than the omitted group (males
18–25). The results also show that the unemployment hazards start increasing after age 50, but
the increase is significant only for the 51–55 age group. The interactions between the indicator
female and dummies for age categories capture differences in duration of unemployment between
women and men within an age group. The results show that gender differences are largest in the
25–30 age group (37 percentage points) and smallest in the 41–45 age group (10 percentage points).
The difference between genders falls by cohorts. However, the differences in unemployment hazards
between genders are only significant in the 18–25, 26–30 and 31–35 age groups, where the females are
35, 37, and 32 (respectively) percentage points less likely to leave unemployment than comparable
males. Additionally, I find the differences in unemployment hazards between genders for ages 18–35
are jointly significant while the differences between genders for age groups 45-50 and 51-55 are jointly
insignificant. Thus the estimates of these interactions, given in column 1, provide evidence that the
differences in unemployment durations between genders varies with age.
Becker (1993) suggests that women have a comparative advantage in childbearing and chil-
drearing, which is why men specialize in market work and women in non-market work. Family
formation typically happens during the late 20s and early 30s for men and women, while the prime
childbearing and childrearing years are between ages 18 and 35.17 Consequently, unemployed mar-
17In the entire GSOEP sample, there are 21, 64, 79, and 83 percent of individuals ages 18–25, 25–30, 31–35, and
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ried men in this age range either have lower reservation wages or higher search intensities than single
men, while unemployed married women either have higher reservation wages or lower search inten-
sities than single women. Thus, the results in column 1 of Table 1.4 might reflect division of labor
in the household since (i) men aged 26-40 have significantly higher hazards than men younger than
25, and (ii) women during their childbearing and childrearing years (ages 18–35) have significantly
lower hazard rates than men, while there is no significant difference between genders at old age.
I am able to empirically test whether these differences in hazard rates between genders are
due to the presence of young children and a partner. In column 2 of Table 1.4, I present estimates of
the specification with the dummies for the presence of children and a partner. In this specification, I
constrain the effects of children and a partner to be the same across genders. The results indicate that
the presence of children ages 0–1 and 2–4 decreases the unemployment hazard 70 and 21 percentage
points (respectively) while the presence of children ages 5–7 increases the unemployment hazard by
22 percentage points. Additionally, I find the presence of a partner increases the unemployment
hazard by 53 and 71 percentage points if the partner is employed and unemployed, respectively.
Finding that individuals are more likely to leave unemployment in presence of an employed partner
is counterintuitive, which is why I test the equality of the effects of a partner’s employment status
on the unemployment hazard. I find no significant difference in the effects of an employed and an
unemployed partner on the unemployment hazard.
In contrast to column 1, column 2 shows that differences in unemployment hazards between
men ages 18–25 and men ages 31–40 disappear after controlling for children and a partner. The
coefficients on interaction between female and indicators for age cohorts indicate that women in any
age group have significantly lower hazards than comparable men, and that these differences between
genders are largest in age groups 25–30 and 31–35. Because I constrain the effects of children and a
partner to be the same across genders, these findings do not come as a surprise, since the coefficients
on age groups and their interactions with female might be capturing differential effects of children
and a partner on the unemployment hazard between genders.
In column 3 of Table 1.4, I present the results of the specification which allows the effects of
children and a partner to differ across genders. The estimates on interactions between the indicator
female and age groups become insignificant for age groups 25–30 and 31–35. Thus, the difference in
36–40, respectively, living with a partner. At the same time, 17, 45, 52, and 34 percent of females ages 18–25, 25–30,
31–35, and 36–40, respectively, have children younger than eight.
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unemployment duration between genders during childbearing and childrearing age disappears after
including controls for children and a partner. Furthermore, the coefficients of interactions between
female and dummies for the presence of children show that the effects of children and a partner
are different across genders. I find that young children significantly increase female unemployment
durations, and that this effect falls with children’s age. For example, women with children ages 0–1
have hazards 80 percentage points lower than comparable men, while women with children ages 2–4
and 5–7 have hazards 43 and 11 percentage points lower (respectively). In contrast to women, I find
no significant difference in unemployment hazards between men with and without children ages 0–4.
On the other hand, men in the presence of children 5–7 have a hazard rate 26 percentage points
higher than men without children or with children older than seven.
The estimates in column 3 indicate that male unemployment durations are significantly
shorter in the presence of a partner, regardless of the partner’s employment status. In contrast, the
interactions between the indicator female and dummies for a partner’s employment status show
that female unemployment spells are significantly longer in the presence of a partner. For example,
women with an employed partner and women with an unemployed partner have a chance of leaving
unemployment 45 and 46 (respectively) percentage points lower than men with a partner, ceteris
paribus.
In contrast to the results in columns 1 and 2, these results show that the hazard rates
fall with age for both genders, but the effect is significant only for individuals older than 40. This
finding is consistent with the theory of human capital investment. Older individuals are less likely to
switch industry or occupation because they experience a greater loss in specific human capital than
younger workers. Older workers are also less likely to invest in new human capital because the return
is expected to be lower at an older age, since older workers are closer to the end of their working life.
The interaction between female and age groups 41–45 and 46–50 shows that females experience an
additional decrease in unemployment hazards by 16 and 25 (respectively) percentage points, relative
to comparable males. This finding indicates that females are less likely to leave unemployment at a
later age, which might indicate that women are even less likely to switch occupations or industries
at an older age than men.
In summary, the results in column 1 of Table 1.4 are similar to Kunze and Troske’s (2012)
findings for West Germany, and show that gender differences in durations of unemployment vary
with age. In columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.4, I present new evidence indicating that differences in
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duration of unemployment between genders are associated with the presence of young children and
a partner.18 These findings are consistent with the theory of division of labor in the household and
are similar to empirical findings by Kunze and Troske (2015) in the U.S.
1.4.2 Differences in Unemployment Durations between East and West
Germans
In Table 1.5, I report estimation results from the Extended Cox regressions which test the
differences in unemployment duration between East and West Germans. In columns 1–4, I present
estimates for women, starting with the simplest model that controls only for personal characteristics
(age, education level), local labor conditions, and state-year fixed effects. Then subsequently I
add controls for non-labor income and indicators for children and a partner, as well as interactions
between the dummy west and indicators for children and a partner. In columns 5–8, I present results
for men in a similar order.
In columns 1 and 5, the coefficients on west indicate that West German females and males
have significantly lower hazards, approximately by 25 and 19 percentage points (respectively), than
their East German counterparts, ceteris paribus. These findings reinforce results from the analysis
of median durations and survivor functions between East and West Germans. After I introduce
controls for non-labor income (public transfers, partner’s wage, income asset transfers) in columns 2
and 6, the differences between East and West Germans increase to 26 and 20 percentage points for
females and males (respectively). These results show that differences in non-labor income are not
primary drivers of differences in unemployment durations between East and West Germans.
In columns 3 and 7, I introduce controls for the presence of young children and a partner,
but I constrain the effects of these variables to be the same across East and West Germans. These
estimates show that West German women have a lower hazard by 21 percentage points than East
German women. Similarly, I find that West German men have a lower unemployment hazard by 13
percentage points than East German men, but this difference is not significant. I also find that the
presence of children ages 0–1 and 2–4 significantly reduces female unemployment hazards, while the
presence of children ages 2–4 and 5–7 significantly increases male unemployment hazards. These
estimates, in contrast to estimates in columns 1–2 and 5–7, indicate that the differences in duration
18I also estimate the same models separately by location of origin, and I find results similar to those in Table 1.4.
These results are available on request.
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of unemployment between Germans are related to the presence of children and a partner.
In columns 4 and 8, I show the final specifications that allow the effects of children and a
partner to differ across East and West Germans, corresponding to equation (1.5). In columns 4 and
8, I find that West German females have hazards nine percentage points higher than East females,
and that West German males have hazards eight percentage points lower than East German males,
but these differences are insignificantly different. Furthermore, the coefficients on the indicators for
children’s age show that both East and West German females have lower unemployment hazards in
the presence of children ages 0–4. Similarly, I find that the presence of children ages 2–7 increases
both East and West German male hazard rates. Finally, the effect of a partner on unemployment
hazard is positive regardless of partner’s employment status, but the effects are more substantial for
males. For example, male hazard in the presence of a partner is 97 percentage points greater than
single male hazard, while a similar comparison between females shows a difference of 37 percentage
points.
The coefficients on interactions of west with children indicators in column 4 indicate that
there is a differential effect of young children on the hazards between East and West Germans. I find
that West German females with children ages 0–1 have hazards 65 percentage points higher than
comparable East German females. This finding might reflect higher opportunity costs of staying in
unemployment for West Germans, but it should be taken with caution due to the small number of
exits from unemployment in the presence of children ages 0–1 in East Germany.19 I also find that
West German females in the presence of children ages 2–4 have hazards 24 percentage points lower
than respective East German females, while in the presence of children ages 5–7 there is neither
an economic nor a statistical difference. In contrast to the differential response to the presence
of children and a partner between East and West German females, I find no significant difference
between East and West German males. The only exception is for the interaction of west with the
indicator of children ages 0–1, where the West German hazard rate is found to be smaller than the
East German hazard rate by 29 percentage points. However, this result should be also taken with
caution, due to a small number of exits from unemployment in the presence of children ages 0–1.20
The coefficients on interactions of west with dummies for a partner indicate that West
German women have hazards 31 and 40 percentage points lower in the presence of an employed
19There are 311 female spells that end in the presence of children age 0–1, of which 111 are East German.
20There are 155 male spells that ended in the presence of children ages 0–1, of which 69 are East German.
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partner and an unemployed partner (respectively) than their East German counterparts. This
result is counterintuitive, but reasonable in the context of institutional settings, since some welfare
programs (such as unemployment insurance) are determined on the household income level, which
starts after expiration of unemployment insurance . Additionally, I test the equality between these
coefficients and find no significant difference. In contrast to females, I find no significant difference in
the effect of a partner on unemployment hazards between East and West German males. Therefore,
these findings reinforce our results from previous section that gender differences in unemployment
durations are driven by children and a partner, and that they are present in both East and West
Germany.
Finding the differential effects in unemployment duration in the presence of young children
and a partner between East and West females can be associated with the differential in intergenera-
tional transmission of human capital. In Becker et al. (2015), the level of intergenerational transfer
of human capital between parents and children is determined by the credit constraint which depend
on earnings, i.e. wealthier parents tend to invest more in the human capital of their children. If the
female unemployment duration in the presence of young children is put in the context of intergener-
ational investment in human capital, then the differential in unemployment durations between East
and West Germans might reflect higher human capital investment by West German parents. This
mechanism is in line with the empirical findings of lower intergenerational educational mobility in
East Germany (Riphahn and Tru¨bswetter, 2013).
I find that the effects of other variables do not change across specifications in Table 1.5,
and that their effects on the duration of unemployment are similar to findings the in literature. My
results also show evidence of longer spells being associated with higher public transfers and a higher
partner’s wage. I also find that labor market tightness (the ratio of the number of job vacancies to
the number of the unemployed) is significantly more important for women than men. The results
indicate that the duration of unemployment varies with age and with education. Older individuals
have longer unemployment spells, while better educated individuals have shorter unemployment
spells.
In summary, conditional analysis confirms the conjectures from section 1.2: (i) unemploy-
ment durations are shorter in East Germany for both genders; (ii) the gap in unemployment hazards
between East and West German women is associated with the presence of young children and a part-
ner; (iii) there is no differential effect of children and a partner on the unemployment hazards of
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East and West German males. These results are consistent with Becker et al. (2015) that there is
more intergenerational transfer of human capital in West Germany.
1.5 Robustness
1.5.1 Unobserved heterogeneity
In Tables 1.6 and 1.7, I present estimates of the differences in unemployment hazards between
genders and between East and West Germans from the Extended Cox model that includes the
presence of individual unobserved heterogeneity. I assume that males and females share a common
baseline in the specifications presented in Table 1.6, and it is assumed to be a piecewise constant
function for each month, i.e. an indicator variable for each month of unemployment. There are no
benefits in allowing the baseline to differ across genders, since I have modeled individual unobserved
heterogeneity. In addition to the coefficients on covariates, I report the estimates of the standard
deviation of the unobserved heterogeneity variance, σu, and the estimate of the portion of the total
variance, ρ, that is due to the panel-level variance.21 I test for the presence of the unobserved
heterogeneity using a likelihood-ratio test where ρ is equal to zero under the null hypothesis. I
perform the likelihood-ratio test for all three specifications in Table 1.6, and I find evidence of
unobserved heterogeneity.22 I perform similar tests for the specifications in Table 1.7, and find
evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in all specifications except for the first specification in column
5.23
In table 1.6, the estimates in column 1 show a difference in unemployment durations between
genders that varies with age. I find that the differences in unemployment hazard rates between
genders are 66 and 62 percentage points for age groups 25–30 and 31–35 (respectively). However,
the results also indicate that the gender differential in unemployment hazards is significant for older
age groups except the oldest age group, 51–55. This finding might be due to omission of variables
accounting for the presence of children and a partner. In contrast to column 1, the estimates in
column 2 show that the differentials in unemployment hazards are smaller but still present across
21When ρ is zero, the panel-level variance component is not important, and the panel estimator is no different from
a pooled estimator.
22The likelihood-ratio tests statistics for H0 : ρ = 0 are LRcol1 = 81.91, LRcol2 = 130.55, LRcol3 = 159.29, and
the critical value with one degree of freedom is 3.842.
23The likelihood-ratio tests statistics for H0ρ = 0 are LRcol1 = 74.08, LRcol2 = 124.10, LRcol3 = 53.84, LRcol4 =
46.85, LRcol5 = 2.43, LRcol6 = 100.60, LRcol7 = 84.55, LRcol8 = 81.91, and the critical value with one degree of
freedom is 3.842.
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all age cohorts after including variables for the presence of children and a partner. In the final
and most flexible specification, I allow the effects of children to vary across genders and find that
the differential in unemployment duration does not vary with age. In addition, I find that the
differences in unemployment hazards between genders are driven by the differential effect of young
children and a partner. For example, the female hazard rates are 86 and 65 percentage point lowers
than comparable male hazards in the presence of children age 0–1 and 2–4 (respectively). In the
presence of a partner, regardless of employment status, the female hazard rate is 57 percentage points
lower than the male hazard rate. Therefore, I find that my main results are robust to individual
unobserved heterogeneity.
In Table 1.7, I present the estimates of the differences between East and West Germans
in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. These estimates indicate differences in unemployment
duration between East and West Germans. In columns 1 and 5, I find that West German women
and men have hazards 24 and 27 percentage points lower than respective East Germans, although
the difference in hazards between East and West women is not significant. The difference in hazards
between East and West Germans increases after I account for the presence of non-labor income
(columns 2 and 6). In the last two specifications for both genders, I first control for presence of the
children and a partner, and then I allow the effects of children and a partner to vary across East
and West Germans. I find that the differences in unemployment hazards between East and West
females are due to differential responses to young children and a partner, even after controlling for
individual unobserved heterogeneity, and the estimates of these effects are very close to the main
results. In contrast to the differences between East and West German females, I find West German
males have a hazard rate that is 20 percentage points lower than the East German male hazard
rate, but this difference is insignificant. I find no differential effect of children or a partner on the
hazard rates between East and West German males, except for the interaction of west with a dummy
variable for the presence of children ages 2–4. Hence, I my main findings regarding the differences
in unemployment hazards between East and West German females is not affected by the presence
of individual unobserved heterogeneity, while the results are somewhat weaker for males.
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1.6 Conclusions
Using the German Socio-Economic Panel, I investigate the differences in unemployment
durations between genders, and between East and West Germans for the period of 1991–2011. I use
unemployment spells of prime age workers (18–55) to control for possible unobserved factors that
might induce differential search between genders and between East and West Germans. A strength
of my data are the availability of information on children, non-labor income, and ability to identify
East and West Germans.
My estimates show that (i) there is a significant difference in unemployment duration be-
tween genders; (ii) upon return to work, females are more likely to take part-time jobs, especially
West German females; (iii) the difference in unemployment durations between the genders varies
with age, i.e. women have significantly longer durations of unemployment during the childbearing
and childrearing ages; (iv) these differences in durations of unemployment between genders are asso-
ciated with the presence of young children and a partner’s employment status; (v) the difference in
unemployment hazards between genders falls from 80 percentage points in the presence of children
ages 0–1 to 40 percentage points in the presence of children ages to 2–4, and to an insignificant
difference in the presence of children ages 5–7; (vi) both East German men and women have lower
durations of unemployment; (vii) these differences between East and West Germans cease to exist
after I account for the presence of children and a partner’s employment status. My main results are
robust to the presence of individual unobserved heterogeneity.
Findings in this paper provide new evidence on the differences in unemployment duration
between genders associated with young children and a partner in Germany. This evidence is similar to
Kunze and Troske’s (2015) findings for the U.S., and suggest that this trend is not unique to the U.S.
This paper also presents empirical evidence at odds with existing theoretical literature of employer
based discrimination (e.g. Black, (1995); Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002), which predicts that women
of all ages experience longer unemployment spells. My results indicate that the differences between
East and West German female unemployment duration are due to the differential effect of children
and a partner. A possible mechanism behind the differential effect of children on the duration
of unemployment between East and West Germans might be the intergenerational transmission of
human capital. Since average West Germans are significantly wealthier than average East Germans,
they invest more in human capital for their children. However, further research is needed to examine
27
if the intergenerational transmission of human capital is the true mechanism.
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Table 1.1: Summary of unemployment spells
West Germans East Germans
Male Female Male Female
Median duration (months) 7 14 6 13
Exits from unemployment (percent)
Full-time 89.86 38.89 95.20 67.06
Part-time 10.14 61.11 4.80 32.94
Total spells exiting unemployment 69.85 60.89 74.60 64.60
Distribution of number of spells
1 64.59 67.54 51.03 55.57
2 21.83 23.17 24.09 25.94
3 7.83 6.34 12.23 10.51
4 3.17 2.14 5.91 4.83
>4 2.58 0.81 6.74 3.15
Number of spells [Exits] 1864[1302] 2948[1795] 2150[1604] 2359[1524]
Number of individuals 1232 2063 1145 1377
Spell per individual 1.51 1.43 1.88 1.71
Total Observations (person-month) 17191 45297 20216 32408
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Table 1.3: Mean and standard deviations for non-labor income by region and gender
West Germans East Germans
Males Females Differnce Males Females Differnce
Mean (Males–Females) Mean (Males–Females)
(std. deviation) (std. error) (std. deviation) (std. error)
Income Assets
1040 1739 -699 336 471 -135
(7273) (11756) (81) (836) (1817) (12)
Public Transfers
8955 5949 3006 9453 8401 1052
(6566) (4857) (58) (6032) (5430) (54)
Partner’s Wage
6367 25538 -19171 5161 12334 -7172
(18465) (25478) (193) (8773) (13783) (102)
Note: All variables of income are in real 2005 e. Averages are take across spells. I report standard deviations and
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 1.4: Unemployment hazards between genders
Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Hazard ratio Standard Error Hazard ratio Standard Error Hazard ratio Standard Error
Age cohorts
26–30 1.249*** (0.0778) 1.162** (0.0724) 0.978 (0.0624)
31–35 1.218*** (0.0884) 1.037 (0.0752) 0.909 (0.0671)
36–40 1.345*** (0.108) 1.126 (0.0915) 0.988 (0.0824)
41–45 1.100 (0.0864) 0.879* (0.0688) 0.805*** (0.0660)
46–50 1.026 (0.0823) 0.796*** (0.0651) 0.734*** (0.0633)
51–55 0.758*** (0.0664) 0.563*** (0.0511) 0.521*** (0.0502)
Female*Age cohort
18–25 0.653*** (0.0406) 0.723*** (0.0456) 1.086 (0.0729)
26–30 0.627*** (0.0527) 0.676*** (0.0557) 0.900 (0.0763)
31–35 0.674*** (0.0638) 0.716*** (0.0660) 0.893 (0.0855)
36–40 0.813** (0.0821) 0.774** (0.0797) 0.902 (0.0952)
41–45 0.904 (0.0954) 0.811** (0.0845) 0.858 (0.0925)
46–50 0.822* (0.0884) 0.727*** (0.0789) 0.774** (0.0881)
51–55 0.891 (0.109) 0.794* (0.100) 0.864 (0.116)
Children age
0–1 0.297*** (0.0191) 0.930 (0.0942)
2–4 0.784*** (0.0339) 1.090 (0.0792)
5–7 1.221*** (0.0515) 1.273*** (0.0869)
Partner
Employed 1.531*** (0.0669) 1.982*** (0.114)
Unemployed 1.710*** (0.0886) 1.987*** (0.142)
Female*Child age
0–1 0.198*** (0.0257)
2–4 0.598*** (0.0528)
5–7 0.883 (0.0756)
Female*Partner
Employed 0.552*** (0.0397)
Unemployed 0.532*** (0.0553)
Education
Apprenticeship 1.187*** (0.0722) 1.197*** (0.0706) 1.211*** (0.0716)
Secondary 1.359*** (0.0784) 1.397*** (0.0782) 1.409*** (0.0782)
Tertiary 1.739*** (0.115) 1.895*** (0.123) 1.896*** (0.124)
Non-labor income YES YES YES
Local labor market condtions YES YES YES
State and year fixed effects YES YES YES
ln(L) -51874 -47227 -47046
Individiuals[Spells] 5817[9321] 5817[9,321] 5817[9,321]
Exits from unemployment 6225 6225 6225
Observations(month-person) 105791 105791 105791
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Results are obtain using the Extend Cox model. I report hazard ratios, exponentiated coefficients, with
corresponding standard errors. Standard errors are obtained via bootstrap with 1000 replications, and I clustered
standard errors at individual level to account for presence of multiple spells per individual. Non-labor income controls
include public transfers, income asset transfers, and partner’s wage, while local labor market conditions include average
state wage and a measure of labor market tightnesses.
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Table 1.5: Differences in unemployment hazard between East and West Germany
Variable
Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
West
0.753*** 0.732*** 0.786*** 1.099 0.801** 0.792** 0.866 0.928
(0.0506) (0.0526) (0.0546) (0.106) (0.0786) (0.0842) (0.0898) (0.108)
Children age
0–1 0.177*** 0.128*** 0.970 0.922
(0.0150) (0.0194) (0.103) (0.136)
2–4 0.588*** 0.694*** 1.144* 1.337***
(0.0299) (0.0482) (0.0849) (0.130)
5–7 1.087 1.099 1.293*** 1.277***
(0.0605) (0.0833) (0.0931) (0.110)
Partner
Employed 1.136** 1.369*** 1.977*** 2.063***
(0.0668) (0.102) (0.136) (0.168)
Unemployed 1.070 1.349*** 1.974*** 1.929***
(0.0861) (0.138) (0.140) (0.184)
West* Children age
0–1 1.653*** 0.714**
(0.287) (0.100)
2–4 0.777*** 1.095
(0.0732) (0.227)
5–7 0.995 1.041
(0.107) (0.152)
West* Partner
Employed 0.683*** 0.877
(0.0676) (0.0914)
Unemployed 0.599*** 1.076
(0.0942) (0.147)
Personal controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Non-labor income NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
State and year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
ln(L) -26295 -25989 -25627 -25608 -21766 -21491 -21370 -21364
Individuals[Spells] 3440[5307] 2377[4014]
Exits from unemployment 3319 2906
Observations(month-person) 72398 33393
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Results are obtain using the Extend Cox model. I report hazard ratios, exponentiated coefficients, with
corresponding standard errors. Standard errors are obtained via bootstrap with 1000 replications, and I clustered
standard errors at individual level to account for presence of multiple spells per individual. Personal controls include
education and age variables. Non-labor income controls include public transfers, income asset transfers, and partner’s
wage, while local labor market conditions include average state wage and a measure of labor market tightnesses.
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Table 1.6: Unemployment hazards between genders with unobserved heterogeneity
Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Hazard ratio Standard Error Hazard ratio Standard Error Hazard ratio Standard Error
Age cohorts
26-30 2.114*** (0.345) 1.674*** (0.191) 1.288** (0.147)
31–35 2.536*** (0.543) 1.782*** (0.269) 1.437** (0.219)
36–40 3.521*** (1.008) 2.376*** (0.480) 1.952*** (0.399)
41–45 2.688*** (0.946) 1.846** (0.472) 1.647* (0.430)
46–50 2.210* (0.983) 1.655 (0.544) 1.494 (0.505)
51–55 1.305 (0.729) 1.100 (0.465) 0.978 (0.425)
Female*Age cohort
18-25 0.496*** (0.0631) 0.625*** (0.0544) 1.082 (0.101)
26-30 0.339*** (0.0692) 0.526*** (0.0657) 0.834 (0.103)
31–35 0.379*** (0.0769) 0.576*** (0.0745) 0.845 (0.112)
36–40 0.570*** (0.105) 0.663*** (0.0881) 0.866 (0.119)
41–45 0.711* (0.137) 0.744** (0.106) 0.815 (0.123)
46–50 0.644** (0.132) 0.666*** (0.1000) 0.714** (0.114)
51–55 0.699 (0.154) 0.724* (0.120) 0.802 (0.142)
Children age
0–1 0.266*** (0.0204) 1.022 (0.132)
2–4 0.612*** (0.0398) 1.179* (0.116)
5–7 1.278*** (0.0725) 1.307*** (0.124)
Partner
Employed 1.771*** (0.108) 2.682*** (0.234)
Unemployed 2.095*** (0.152) 2.594*** (0.265)
Female*Child age
0–1 0.142*** (0.0235)
2–4 0.352*** (0.0472)
5–7 0.897 (0.106)
Female*Partner
Employed 0.427*** (0.0456)
Unemployed 0.434*** (0.0614)
Education
Apprenticeship 1.438*** (0.164) 1.325*** (0.106) 1.343*** (0.110)
Secondary 1.880*** (0.233) 1.651*** (0.129) 1.673*** (0.133)
Tertiary 2.994*** (0.491) 2.556*** (0.244) 2.592*** (0.249)
Non-labor income YES YES YES
Local labor market condtions YES YES YES
State and year fixed effects YES YES YES
σu 1.794 (0.294) 1.057 (0.099) 1.099 (0.089)
ρ 0.662 (0.073) 0.404 (0.045) 0.424 (0.039)
ln(L) -21880 -21633 -21441
Individuals[Spells] 5817[9321] 5817[9,321] 5817[9,321]
Exits from unemployment 6225 6225 6225
Observations(month-person) 105791 105791 105791
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Exponentiated coefficients are reported with corresponding standard errors. Standard errors are clustered at
individual level to account for presence of multiple spells per individual. I estimate a random coefficient clog-log
model, a discrete counter version of the Extended Cox model, in which unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to follow
Gaussian distribution. I provide estimates of the standard deviation of unobserved heterogeneity variance, σu and
the portion of the total variance that is due to the panel-level variance, ρ. Also, note that in these specifications I do
not allow the baseline to differ across genders.
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Table 1.7: Unemployment hazards between East and West Germans with unobserved heterogeneity
Variable
Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
West
0.760 0.575*** 0.757*** 1.050 0.727** 0.636** 0.765* 0.812
(0.326) (0.0880) (0.0661) (0.124) (0.108) (0.118) (0.116) (0.136)
Children age
0–1 0.143*** 0.103*** 1.090 1.086
(0.0140) (0.0167) (0.151) (0.205)
2–4 0.404*** 0.491*** 1.264** 1.568***
(0.0383) (0.0526) (0.137) (0.224)
5–7 1.122* 1.089 1.353*** 1.333**
(0.0771) (0.101) (0.138) (0.170)
Partner
Employed 1.161** 1.409*** 2.885*** 2.940***
(0.0854) (0.130) (0.344) (0.399)
Unemployed 1.090 1.383*** 2.754*** 2.599***
(0.107) (0.166) (0.329) (0.383)
West* Children age
0–1 1.697*** 0.990
(0.326) (0.268)
2–4 0.768** 0.619**
(0.0864) (0.125)
5–7 1.072 1.046
(0.141) (0.214)
West* Partner
Employed 0.680*** 0.910
(0.0816) (0.139)
Unemployed 0.592*** 1.152
(0.113) (0.228)
Personal controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Non-labor income NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
State and year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
σu 0.244 1.836 0.953 0.907 0.722 1.656 1.249 1.225
(5.648) .529 (0.115) (0.115) (0.466) (0.378) (0.169) (0.163)
ρ 0.0349 0.672 0.356 0.333 0.241 0.625 0.487 0.477
(1.560) (0.127) (.055) (0.056) (0.236) (0.107) (0.068) (0.067)
ln(L) -13077 -12756 -12425 -12408 -9399 -9077 -8962 -8958
Individuals[Spells] 3440[5307] 2377[4014]
Exits from unemployment 3319 2906
Observations(month-person) 72398 33393
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Exponentiated coefficients are reported with corresponding standard errors. Standard errors are clustered at
individual level to account for presence of multiple spells per individual. I estimate a random coefficient clog-log
model, a discrete counter version of the Extended Cox model, in which unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to follow
Gaussian distribution. σu is the standard deviation of the heterogeneity variance, and ρ is the portion of the total
variance that is due to the panel-level variance.
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Figure 1.1: Unemployment survivor functions by genders and age cohort, West Germans
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Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: The survivor functions are calculated using the Kaplan–Meier estimator. For all age groups, the Peto–Peto–
Prentice rank test of equality between survivor functions yields p=0.001
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Figure 1.2: Unemployment survivor functions by genders and age cohort, East Germans
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Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: The survivor functions are calculated using the Kaplan–Meier estimator. For all age groups, the Peto–Peto–
Prentice rank test of equality between survivor functions yields p=0.001
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Figure 1.3: Labor market tightness in East and West Germany, 1990-2015
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Federal Statistics Office in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt).
Note: Labor market tightness is ratio of vacancies to number of registered unemployed individuals.
38
Figure 1.4: Densities of real wages in East and West Germany
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Source: Author’s calculations using the entire German Socio-Economic Panel sample of full-time employed individuals.
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Chapter 2
The Hidden Cost of
Homeownership in Germany:
Unemployment Length
2.1 Introduction
Homeownership is associated with a number of positive outcomes such as urban sprawl or
enacting zoning laws. There is evidence that homeowners have better physical and mental health,
are less likely to be victims of crime, and are more politically and socially involved in local affairs
than renters (Dietz and Haurin, 2003). However, homeownership negatively affects labor market
mobility, for example, literature finds that homeownership is associated with higher rates of unem-
ployment and lower labor mobility in the OECD countries (Oswald, 1996; Nickell and Layard, 1999;
Green and Hendershott, 2001a; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2013)1. Additionally, understanding the
interaction between homeownership and the labor market is important for policy evaluation such as
unemployment benefits and homeownership subsidies.
In this paper, I study the effect of homeownership on the unemployment duration in Ger-
many between 1990 and 2011. I use micro-data to study the effects of homeownership on unem-
1A 10 percentage point increase in homeownership rate is associated with a rise in unemployment rate between
1.3 and 2 percentage points (Oswald, 1996; Nickell and Layard, 1999).
40
ployment duration, and I address self-selection into homeownership by using the full information
maximum likelihood and exclusion restriction2. Homeownership can increase unemployment du-
ration, namely by decreasing geographical mobility. In the context of the job search model, this
mechanism would increase reservation wages for jobs requiring moves, which would reduce the rate
of exits from unemployment (unemployment hazard rate) to the non-local labor market. Even if
homeowners increase search efforts in local labor markets to compensate for higher reservation wages
to non-local jobs, Munch et al. (2006) shows that homeowners have lower chances of leaving unem-
ployment than renters under fairly general assumptions. In addition, Munch et al. (2006) shows that
the difference in the rate of exits from unemployment between homeowners and renters is an empir-
ical question that depends on factors such as the size of a country, distribution of industries across
a country, as well as cultural and linguistic differences, etc. I find that homeownership increases
unemployment duration after I control for self-selection into homeownership.
Previous studies find mixed evidence on the effects of homeownership on unemployment as
well as on labor mobility, and this evidence varies with the type of data used (micro vs macro),
with a country, and the econometric approach3. In Germany, previous literature using regional-
level data finds that homeownership is associated with higher rates of unemployment in Germany
(Lerbs, 2011; Wolf and Caruana-Galizia, 2015) while only Wolf and Caruana-Galizia (2015) control
for self-selection into homeownership using the instrumental variable approach.
In Section 2.2, I provide some information about my sample and examine the differences in
unemployment duration between homeowners and renters using median duration and non-parametric
survivor functions. My data comes from the German-Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) for 1990–2011.
The advantage of the GSOEP over official German administrative data is the availability of data
on homeownership status, partner status, and presence of young children, which are important
determinants of both labor mobility and homeownership. My sample consists of unemployed men
in their prime working years, ages 25–55, from the moment they transition to unemployment until
the time at which they either exit unemployment to work or drop out of the survey. I use prime-
age workers because they are more similar with respect to decisions affecting their job search than
workers reentering the labor market after inactivity, workers coming out of education, or workers
2This approach is similar to Heckman’s sample selection model but it is more appropriate for duration analysis
and more flexible.
3Evidence of the positive effects or no effects of homeownership includes: van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004),
Munch et al. (2006), Tas¸kın and Yaman (2016), while these studies find negative effects: Oswald (1996), Munch et
al. (2008), Blanchflower and Oswald (2013).
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that are close to retirement. Finally, I choose to use only men to avoid potential issues with women
staying in unemployment due to childbearing and childrearing.
When I examine the median duration of unemployment and probability of remaining in
unemployment, I find that homeowners have shorter spells of unemployment than renters, and
this difference is especially large during longer spells. The median duration of unemployment for
homeowners is five months compared to seven months for renters. Additionally, the difference in
the third quartile of unemployment duration between homeowners and renters is six months, i.e.
homeowners and renters spend 13 and 19 months in unemployment, respectively. I also compare
differences in probability of remaining in unemployment between homeowners and renters and find
that homeowners have significantly lower probabilities of remaining in unemployment than renters.
Finally, a comparison of homeowners and renters across observables shows that the two groups are
similar with an average homeowner being slightly older and better educated, and being more likely
to have a partner who on average earns more than an average renter’s partner.
In Section 2.3, I present the empirical strategy which controls for the differences in the
observables and corrects for self-selection into homeownership. Because of high transaction costs,
unfavorable financing terms and lack of tax breaks or subsidies for homeowners in Germany, most
households in Germany purchase homes only if they plan to settle down in a certain region for an
extended period of time4. Thus, men choosing homeownership, for example, probably have stronger
preferences for location compared to renters (e.g. proximity to family or stability). Then in case of
unforeseen unemployment, homeowners might be less willing to leave unemployment for a job that
requires a move because they are inherently less mobile and not for their choice of homeownership.
Thus, this would produce an upward bias in the estimate. It is also possible for the bias to be
downward. For example, it is possible that some men are more productive and that these men are
more likely to be homeowners while at the same time they face better opportunities in labor market
in case of unemployment.
I address self-selection into homeownership by simultaneously estimating the duration model
and the homeownership model while allowing the models to be correlated by specifying a bivariate
distribution for two unobserved variables; one affects the duration model and the other affects the
4In Germany, transaction costs: including taxes, realtor and notary fees are approximately 10 percent of the pur-
chase price (Catte et al., 2004). Additionally, the German housing market is inflexible, mainly due to the unfavorable
property loan market compared to neighboring countries. The market is characterized with the long term mortgage
loans and fixed interest rates for a period of 5 to 10 years, as well as with high early repayment penalties in the case
of terminating the mortgage earlier (Voigtla¨nder, 2009).
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homeownership model5. The bivariate distribution is estimated non-parametrically to minimize the
biasing impact of the distributional assumption (Heckman and Singer, 1984a). The identification
is achieved using the exclusion restriction, i.e. there is a variable or a set of variables that affect
the probability of homeownership but not the exit rate out of unemployment. Similar to van Leu-
vensteijn and Koning (2004), I use state-level homeownership rates as the excluded variable since it
is reasonable to expect that homeownership rates are correlated with the individual probability of
owning a home, but not with the unemployment duration.
In Section 2.4, I summarize estimation results for the effect of homeownership on unemploy-
ment duration. I estimate the model with and without correction for self-selection into homeowner-
ship. I use the model without correction as a baseline and find that homeowners have a 13 percent
higher rate of exists from unemployment than comparable renters, and this difference is statistically
significant. This finding is similar to the evidence found using median duration and non-parametric
estimate of the probability of remaining in unemployment. However, these findings need to be taken
with caution because i) I do not control for unobserved heterogeneity, which in duration models can
create negative duration dependence, and ii) I do not control for self-selection into homeownership.
After I correct for unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection into homeownership, I find
that homeowners have a 56 percent lower exit rate out of unemployment than renters. This is
statistically significant at 5 percent level. The bias-corrected 95 percent confidence interval shows
that homeowners have between an eight and 62 percent lower exit rate out of unemployment than
comparable renters6. Finding that homeownership reduces the rate of exits from unemployment
suggests that homeownership comes with the costs of lower labor mobility as argued by Oswald
(1996), and more recently, Blanchflower and Oswald (2013). Furthermore, my results are also in line
with evidence from German regional level data (Lerbs, 2011; Wolf and Caruana-Galizia, 2015), and
with micro-evidence from France presented by Burnet and Lesueur (2003). Evidence in this paper
is at odds with evidence from Denmark and the U.S., where homeowners are more likely to leave
unemployment sooner than renters (Munch et al., 2006; Tas¸kın and Yaman, 2016).
I contribute to the literature by providing a micro evidence of homeownership increasing
unemployment duration in Germany. The use of micro-data instead of macro or meso-data allows
me to correct for the spurious relationship between homeownership and unemployment present in
5This methodology was successfully in van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) and Munch et al. (2006).
6Standard asymptotic inference is not appropriate in this case due to left skewness in the empirical distribution of
my estimate.
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regional and macro data, and to identify the causal effect of homeownership on unemployment
duration. Furthermore, the evidence on the effects of homeownership on unemployment duration in
this paper is more robust than the evidence presented in Green and Hendershott (2001b), Coulson
and Fisher (2002), and Burnet and Lesueur (2003) because I control for possible self-selection into
homeownership, which proves to be important due to the large bias in the estimate. Finally, I
provide concluding remarks in Section 2.5.
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2.2 Unemployment Duration and Homeownership in Ger-
many
2.2.1 Data and Sample
I use data on unemployment spells from the German Socio–Economic Panel (GSOEP) which
annually collects data on households and individuals in Germany. In 1984, the survey began by
collecting data on 4,500 households in West Germany, and in 1990, the survey expanded its scope
to East Germany by including an additional 2,179 households. As of the 2011 update, the survey
includes 12,290 households and 21,069 individuals.7 The GSOEP contains a large array of socio-
economic variables including information on homeownership, childrens’ ages, partners’ wages, and
non-labor income, which are not available in administrative data.
I use data for the period 1991–2011 to construct unemployment spells. The GSOEP survey
asks two types of labor questions: contemporaneous and retrospective. In a monthly calendar
section individuals retrospectively declare their labor status for each month in the previous year. I
construct unemployment spells using this part of the survey. In the contemporaneous part of the
survey, individuals provide information on the exact date when they lost their last job during the
previous year or during the survey year. I use this information to cross-reference beginnings of the
constructed spells. After cross-referencing the dates, I obtain a sample of 9,321 spells for 5,817
individuals, of which 57 percent are female spells.
According to the International Labor Organization’s 1982 definition of unemployment, a
person is considered to be unemployed if he or she is without employment while currently available
and seeking work. Unfortunately, the GSOEP does not collect information on a person’s availability
for work or whether the person is actively looking for a job on a monthly basis. To circumvent
this problem, I study the spells of individuals in their prime working age (25–55) who entered
unemployment either from employment (95 percent of spells) or after completing an apprenticeship
education (5 percent of spells), since these individuals are most likely to be available and looking
for work. In addition, I restrict the sample to men in order to avoid potential issues with women
staying in unemployment due to childbearing and childrearing. This leaves 3,077 spells for 1,820
individuals.
7For further information about the GSOEP, see Rahmann and Schupp (2013).
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2.2.2 Unemployment Duration
In Table 2.1, I summarize unemployment duration by the status of homeownership. Exam-
ining the survival time indicates that homeowners and renters have the same duration in the 25th
percentile, and that homeowners have a shorter duration of unemployment in the upper percentiles of
the survivor function, probability of staying in unemployment beyond month t. For example, at the
median, homeowners are unemployed for two months less than renters, while in the 75th percentile
of unemployment duration, homeowners spend six months less in unemployment than renters. In
Figure 2.1, I plot separately the survivor functions for homeowners and renters estimated using the
Kaplan-Meier estimator, and find that the renters’ survivor function is higher than the homeowners’
survivor function. I find that this difference between survivor functions is significantly different
using the Peto-Peto-Prentice rank test of equality between survivor functions. Despite differences
in duration of unemployment, I find a lack of difference in the types of exits from unemployment
between homeowners and renters. Both groups have similar rates of exits from unemployment to
both full- and part-time employment. Finally, I do not observe exits out of unemployment for 20
percent of homeowners’ spells and 26 percent of renters’ spells.
In Table 2.2, I present spell composition by characteristics including age, education, partner
status, children, and non-labor income. I find that homeowners are approximately equally likely to
enter unemployment spells across age groups, while renters are more likely to be young when entering
spells of unemployment. In particular, I find that approximately 30 percent of homeowners’ spells
originate at age age 35 or younger, while 43 percent of renters’ spells originate at age 35 or younger.
I also find that renters are slightly less educated than homeowners. Homeowners are five percentage
points more likely to have high school as a terminal degree than renters, and about four percentage
points less likely to have only elementary education as their terminal degree.
Furthermore, I find that homeowners are five percentage points more likely to have a partner.
Interestingly, homeowners are 11 percentage points more likely to have an employed partner than
renters and seven percentage points less likely to have unemployed partners than renters. Home-
owners have one or more children in 57 percent of unemployment spells, while renters have one or
more children in 52 percent of unemployment spells. Additionally, homeowners are nine percentage
points more likely to have children age 13–18 during their unemployment spells. These differences
between homeowners and renters can be indicative of homeowners’ preferences for stability or loca-
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tion. Finally, homeowners on average have access to e 2,133 and e 425 more than renters coming
from partners’ wages and public transfers, respectively.
In summary, homeowners have shorter lengths of unemployment than renters and the differ-
ences are especially large above median duration of unemployment. Additionally, homeowners have
significantly lower survivor function than renters. Thus, this preliminary evidence suggests that
homeowners are more likely to end unemployment spells sooner than renters, which contradicts the
Oswald hypothesis. However, I also find that homeowners are older, more likely to have a partner
and children, and have higher non-labor income.
2.2.3 Homeownership in Germany
When it comes to an international comparison in homeownership rates, Germany’s home-
ownership rate of 43 percent is lower than in Spain (80 percent), Italy (80 percent), United Kingdom
(70 percent), Austria (60 percent), France (55 percent), etc. (Voigtla¨nder, 2009). Voigtla¨nder points
at five key factors that are responsible for the low homeownership rate: i.) the relative size and
quality of the rental market, ii.) the less favorable tax treatment compared to neighboring countries,
iii.) the unfavorable terms of financing (substantial down payments, long-term fixed-rate loans, and
high transaction costs), iv.) the relative costs of owned and rented units, and v.) slow appreciation
of the houses. Additionally, Boehm and Schlottmann (2014) argue that demographic composition in
Germany is an important factor of low homeownership rate. In particular, they argue that marital
status, a primary demographic determinant of housing choice, is a reason for the low homeownership
rate in Germany since 57 percent of adults are single.
I summarize average homeownership rates by the state over period 1990 to 2011 in Table
2.3. In addition, I provide time series of homeownership by the state in Figure 2.2. I generate
these statistics using all the data from the GSOEP for 1990–2011, and I use individual weights in
the aggregation process to ensure that the rate is representative of Germany. Table 2.3 shows large
variation in homeownership rates across states with the average lowest rate of 11 percent in Berlin and
the average highest rate of 62 percent in Saarland. Although one might think that the large variation
in homeownership rates is the product of GSOEP data being non-representative of Germany, in Table
2.4 I show that these average rates are similar to averages collected by the German Microcensus8.
8Although German Microcensus is a more representative data set, I do not use German Microcensus to obtain
homeownership rates because the data is only available for a limited number of years.
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Finally, Figure 2.2 shows developments in homeownership rates across German states over time.
The figure points at the variation in the time trends across states. Thus, the aggregated statistics
suggest the presence of large variations in homeownership rates across German states, and in time-
trends of homeownership across the states. The large regional variation in the homeownership rate
is associated with regional differences in relative housing prices and capital requirements needed for
the purchase of a housing unit, regional household composition, level of urbanization, employment
levels, and neighborhood characteristics (Lerbs and Oberst, 2014).
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2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 The Job Search Model
I use the Munch et al. (2006) job search model as a foundation for my empirical model.
Munch et al. extend Mortensen’s (1986) job search model by introducing two types of exits from
unemployment: local and non-local exits. In Munch et al.’s model, risk-neutral individuals look for
a job while facing exogenous labor market conditions. It also assumed that individuals must live and
work in the same region. Additionally, it is assumed that renters do not have costs associated with
moving, while homeowners face the cost of selling their homes. During each period, an unemployed
person receives job offers in local and non-local labor markets with some probabilities. The job
offers come with the wage offers, which are identically and independently drawn from a same known
distribution function, F (w).
Given these assumptions, Munch et al. (2006) show that an unemployed renter is indifferent
between accepting a job in a local and non-local market, since reservation wage, wR, is the same
for accepting a job offer in the two markets. Moreover, Munch et al. show that an unemployed
homeowner has a larger reservation wage for job offers on the non-local market, wRn , than the
reservation wage for jobs in the local market, wRl , since the homeowner needs to be compensated
for costs associated with moving. Additionally, a homeowner is willing to reduce wRl below w
R to
avoid incurring moving costs. Thus, a homeowner has a lower reservation wage in the local labor
market, while a homeowner has higher reservation wage than a renter in the non-local labor market,
wRl < w
R < wRn .
The model also implies that the hazard rate out of unemployment is a product of the arrival
rate of the job offers and the probability of accepting the job offer. Hence, a renter’s hazard rate
to a job in the local labor market, λRl , and a renter’s hazard rate to a job in the non-local labor
market, λRn are
λRl = αl
[
1− F (wR)] and λRn = αn [1− F (wR)] (2.1)
where αl and αn are job arrival rates in the local and non-local labor markets. Similarly, a home-
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owner’s hazard rates are
λHl = αl
[
1− F (wRl )
]
and λHn = αn
[
1− F (wRn )
]
. (2.2)
Given wRl < w
R < wRn , it follows that homeowners have higher hazard rate of unemployment in the
local labor market than renters, and that renters have higher hazard rates out of unemployment in
the non-local labor market than homeowners. Finally, the overall hazard rates out of unemployment,
λHl +λ
H
n and λ
R
l +λ
R
n , depend on the relative sizes of arrival rates, αl and αn, and the relative sizes
of F (wRl )− F (wR) and F (wRn )− F (wR) 9.
2.3.2 Empirical Model
I employ a hazard model to estimate the effect of homeownership on the rate at which
individuals leave unemployment. One limitation of my study is the inability to identify if individuals
leave unemployment for jobs in or out of the local labor market due to the lack of information. Let
the duration of unemployment be represented by a positive continuous random variable T . Then
the unemployment hazard for an individual i at time t, λi(t), is defined by
λi(t) := lim
h↘0+
Pr(t+ h > Ti > t|Ti > t) + ν
h
. (2.3)
I parameterize person i’s hazard λi(t) as a function of duration dependence λ0(t), the binary variable
for homeownership status homeowner, a matrix of observable variables X, and unobserved time-
invariant characteristic νu. In the estimation, I specify λ0(t) as a cubic polynomial rather than
piecewise constant function to reduce the number of parameters from 56 to 33. Thus, the individual
hazard rate out of unemployment is
λi(t|X,homeowner) = exp(λ0(t) + δ homeowner +X β + νu). (2.4)
I use a discrete hazard model to accommodate the discrete feature of my data, i.e. the spell
length is reported in months. Camron and Trivedi (2005) show that corresponding discrete hazard
function λd analogous to (2.4) and discrete survivor function Sd for individual i during [tk−1, tk) are
9In estimation, I only concern myself with the overall hazard rates due to lack of data on location of employment
after leaving the unemployment spell.
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λdk(tk|X,homeowner) = 1− exp [− exp (λ0(t) + δ homeowner +Xβ + νu)] , and
Sdk(tk|Xi) = 1− λdk(tk, X).
(2.5)
Let d be a binary variable equal to one if an individual’s observed leaving unemployment for employ-
ment during the final month of observation, and zero otherwise, then the contribution of individual
i’s spell of unemployment lasting T months to the likelihood function is
Li = (1− ST )d S1−dT
T−1∏
j=1
Sj . (2.6)
I refer to (2.6) as the unemployment model.
The concern with estimating the effect of the homeownership on the hazard rate this way is
a possible selection bias into homeownership. For example, some households might be less mobile,
because of their preferences for location due to proximity to family, size of the family, etc. Then,
such households are more likely to choose to homeownership. In the case of unemployment, these
households might be less willing to move for job opportunities outside of the local labor market.
However, this is not due to their choice of homeownership but rather due to their preferences for
location. To control for the possible presence of self-selection, I estimate simultaneously the hazard
model and the homeownership model while allowing the two models to be correlated via bivariate
distribution for two unobserved variables from each model (van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004;
Munch et al., 2006; Munch et al., 2008).
In the homeownership model, I assume that the probability of an individual choosing home-
ownership is a logit function of observables X and an unobserved component νh,
Pri(home = 1|Xi, νh) = exp [Xi γ + νh]
1 + exp [Xi γ + νh]
. (2.7)
Then the contribution to the homeownership likelihood function from an individual i is
Li(t|Xi, νh) = Pr(Xi, νh)zi [1− Pr(Xt, νh)](1−zi) (2.8)
where zi is equal to one if individual is homeowner and 0 otherwise.
51
If I assume that that correlation between the hazard model and homeownership model,
beyond correlation captured by explanatory variables, can be represented by the individual-specific
heterogeneity terms that are time-invariant and constant across repeated spells, then the complete
likelihood function for individual i is
L =
M∏
m=1
∫
νu
∫
νh
Lu (t|Xm, νu) Lh (t|Xm, νh) dF (νu, νh) (2.9)
where M is the number of spell individual experiences in the sample period, and F (νu, νh) is the
joint distribution function for the unobserved heterogeneity.
2.3.3 Identification
There are two possible strategies to identify parameters in equation (2.9): i) using multiple
spells of unemployment per individual with variation in homeownership status during the spells
and ii) using exclusion restriction. The first identification method uses Honore´’s (1993) results for
duration models with multiple spells which show that parameters are identified if at least a subset
of individuals has multiple spells of unemployment across which homeownership status changes, i.e
individuals are homeowners in some and renters in other spells. Conditional on F (νu, νh), the equa-
tions are independent and identification depends on intra-person-spell variation in homeownership
status. In my sample, only four percent of individuals are observed as homeowners and renters over
different spells, which is why I opt for the second methodology. This type of identification was used
in the literature on duration models, as well as in a similar context by Munch et al. (2006, 2008).
The second identification methodology uses an exclusion restriction, i.e. a variable or set
of variables that affect the choice of homeownership but do not have a direct impact on the labor
market. I use state-level homeownership rate as an excluded variable in the duration model, since
it is reasonable to expect that the state homeownership rates affects the probability of being a
homeowner but does not affect the labor market outcomes. This strategy was successfully used in a
similar context by van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) and Tas¸kın and Yaman (2016).
2.3.4 Estimation
I use a finite mixture model proposed by Heckman and Singer (1984a) to estimate equa-
tion (2.9), which assumes that the unknown distribution F (νu, νh) is discrete and that it can be
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represented with a finite number of points of support. It is assumed that each νu and νh can take
two values with one of the support points being normalized to zero for both νu and νh because the
baseline acts as a constant term in both equations. There are four possible combinations of this
bivariate unobserved heterogeneity distribution and their respective probability weights. One can
think of each of these values corresponding to a subsample of the individuals in the data set that are
not observable to the econometrician. The individual likelihood in equation (2.9) can be rewritten
as
Li =
M∏
m=1
4∑
j=1
[pij Lu (t|X, νu) Lh (t|X, νh)] (2.10)
where pij is parameterized using the logit function. Thus, I estimate the vectors of parameters
β and γ, the support points νu and νh, and the associated probability weights pi1 to pi3
10. Because
the likelihood in (2.10) is not globally concave, I estimate this likelihood via simulated annealing, a
global optimization routine11.
10This is a nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator since both points of support and its respective probability
weights are estimated.
11 I use GenSA package available in R to perform simulated annealing (Xiang et al., 2013).
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2.4 The Effect of Homeownership on Unemployment Dura-
tion
In this section, I present estimation results: first, for the model which does not correct for
selection into homeownership in Table 2.5; and second, for the model which corrects for selection
into homeownership in Table 2.6. Estimating the model without correction for selection into home-
ownership is equivalent to estimating the unemployment hazard and homeownership choice models
separately. In Table 2.5, the first two columns show coefficient estimates and their respective stan-
dard errors for the unemployment hazard model, while the third and fourth columns show estimates
and standard errors for the homeownership choice model.
In the context of my econometric model presented in Section 2.3, estimating the model
without correction for selection into homeownership is the same as assuming that there are no unob-
served differences in exits from unemployment between homeowners and renters after controlling for
observable. Results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.5 show that homeowners have significantly higher
exit rates out of unemployment than renters. In fact, homeowners are 13 percent (= exp(0.122)−1)
more likely to leave unemployment spells than renters, ceteris paribus, which is a similar finding to
the univariate analysis of unemployment duration using the Kaplan-Meier estimator. This finding is
contrary to the regional evidence presented in Wolf and Caruana-Galizia (2015), who find a positive
effect of homeownership on the unemployment rate.
I also find that the exit rate out of unemployment increases with age (Table 2.5). Moreover,
I find that better-educated individuals have higher hazard rates compared to those individuals
with only an elementary education, but these coefficients have large standard errors and are not
statistically significant. Furthermore, I find that individuals with a partner have higher exit rates
from unemployment than single individuals, but this effect is only significant for men with an
unemployed partner. In particular, men with an unemployed partner are 23 percent more likely to
leave unemployment than single men (= exp(0.212)−1). In regards to non-labor income, I find that
a public transfer significantly lower exits out of unemployment while a partner’s income increases
exits out of unemployment. Finally, I note that a decrease in labor market tightness, a ratio of
vacancies to unemployed individuals, increases the exits out of unemployment.
Estimates for the homeownership model, Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2.5, indicate that state-
level homeownership rate is an important predictor of being a homeowner. Also, I find that the
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probability of becoming a homeowner significantly falls with age, which is expected given that
purchasing a home often involves taking a mortgage and banks are less likely to approve mortgages
for older individuals. On the other hand, the probability of being a homeowner increases with the
level of education. A man with an employed partner is more likely to be a homeowner than single
men, while a man with an unemployed partner is less likely to be a homeowner when compared to
single man. I find that non-labor income coming from public transfers is positively associated with
the likelihood of being a homeowner, although it is not statistically significant. Finding positive
qualitative effects of public transfers on the probability of being a homeowner might be surprising,
but it is expected since the largest portion of non-labor income are unemployment benefits, which
are a function of previous wages. Thus, it is expected that men with higher earnings are more
likely to become homeowners. I also find that the partner’s income is negatively associated with the
probability of being a homeowner, but this effect is statistically insignificant. Finally, I find that an
increase in labor market tightness has a negative effect on the probability of becoming a homeowner.
The effect of homeownership on unemployment hazard without control for self-selection
needs to be taken with caution because survival models are prone to a severe bias in the presence
of self-selection (Heckman and Singer, 1984a). It is conceivable to have both upward and downward
bias in the homeownership estimate. For example, more productive individuals are more likely
to leave unemployment sooner (see column 1 in Table 2.5), and at the same time, they will be
more likely to be homeowners due to higher earnings (see column 2 in Table 2.5). A downward
bias in the estimate of homeownership might come because some individuals might have strong
preferences for location (proximity to family or friends). Then these individuals might be more
likely to become homeowners, and in cases of unemployment, these individuals might be less willing
to consider employment opportunities outside of local labor markets. Thus, their unemployment
spells would be longer. This is why I employ joint estimation of two models and allow two models to
be correlated through unobserved effects, while I use exclusion restriction to achieve identification
of the homeownership parameter.
In Table 2.6, I present the estimates of homeownership on exit rates out of unemployment.
The standard errors are obtained via bootstrap with 1000 replications. I report 95% bias-corrected
confidence intervals (Efron and Tibshirani, 1986) because standard inference that relays on asymp-
totic normality is not appropriate given skewness of the empirical distribution of my estimate for
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homeownership (see Figure 2.3)12. After introducing unobserved heterogeneity in both equations
and accounting for selection into homeownership by allowing the unobserved effects to be correlated,
I find that homeowners have 56 percent lower unemployment hazards (= exp(−0.832)− 1) and this
is statistically significant at a 5 percent level.
The correlation between unobserved effects νu in hazard model, and νu in unemployment
model, is positive and statistically significant which implies the need to account for selection into
homeownership. Contrasting the effects of homeownership on exit rates from unemployment without
and with correction for self-selection, 0.122 vs. −0.832, indicates that unobserved characteristics that
make individuals more likely to be homeowners also increases the rate of exits from unemployment.
This is expected because individuals with better labor market opportunities are also more likely
to be homeowners. Thus, finding that homeowners have 56 percent lower unemployment hazards
than comparable renters after accounting for self-selection supports the Oswald hypothesis that
homeownership reduces labor mobility. My finding is also consistent with evidence from the German
regional data, which shows that higher rates of homeownership are associated with higher levels of
unemployment (Lerbs, 2011; Wolf and Caruana-Galizia, 2015).
In the international context on the effects of homeownership on labor mobility, my results
are similar to Burnet and Lesueur (2003), who find that homeownership increases unemployment
duration in France. In contrast to Burnet and Lesueur (2003), Munch et al. (2006) find that home-
owners have shorter unemployment duration even after correcting for self-selection in Denmark.
After distinguishing between types of exits from unemployment, local labor market vs. non-local
labor market, Munch et al. and van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2007) find that homeowners have
lower exit rates from unemployment to the non-local labor market, and higher exit rates from un-
employment into local labor markets in Denmark and the Netherlands. Thus, their findings provide
empirical support for Oswald’s hypothesis, mainly that homeownership hinders geographical labor
mobility, but this mechanism is not strong enough in these two countries. A possible explanation
for differences between Germany and France, on one side, and Denmark and the Netherlands, on
the other side, might be in the countries’ geographical sizes, which also affects the size of the local
and national labor market.
12I use bias-corrected confidence intervals over accelerated bias-corrected confidence intervals due to computation
difficulty with estimating acceleration factor.
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2.5 Conclusion
I study the effect of homeownership on unemployment duration using unemployment spells
from the German-Socio Economic Panel for the period 1990–2011. Although the economic theory
predicts that homeownership will reduce exits from unemployment to non-local jobs, i.e. jobs that
require a move, the theory does not provide a clear prediction about the total rate of exits from
unemployment, since this depends on both local and non-local labor markets. In addition, there is
self-selection into homeownership that can produce both upward and downward bias. For example,
some households might be inherently less mobile, e.g preferences for proximity to family, in which case
these households choose homeownership rather than renting. Then in the case of unemployment,
these men might stay longer in unemployment spells but not due to homeownership. It is also
possible that some men are more productive and are more likely to be a homeowner, and in case of
unemployment, these men have better labor market opportunities. I correct for possible self-selection
into homeownership by simultaneously estimating the hazard model, with the homeownership model
and at the same time I allow the two models to be correlated by specifying a bivariate distribution
for two unobserved variables, one of which affects the hazard model while the other affects the
hazard rate. Additionally, I minimize the biasing impact of distributional assumption by estimating
it nonparametrically. I use state-level homeownership rates as an exclusion variable in the hazard
model to identify the parameter.
My initial findings suggest that homeowners have a median unemployment length that is two
months shorter than renters. After introducing other observable controls, I find that homeowners
have a 13 percent higher rate of exits from unemployment than renters. However, I find that
homeowners are 56 percent less likely to leave unemployment compared to renters when I correct for
self-selection into homeownership, and this effect is statistically significant at a 5 percent level. These
findings are in line with previous research that used regional level data, and indicates a potential
negative consequence of homeownership on the unemployment duration. Furthermore, a potential
extension of this paper is to examine how homeownership affects unemployment exits into a local
labor market vs. how it affects the unemployment exits that require the change of residency. Finally,
it would be interesting to evaluate the joint effects of homeownership and unemployment benefits
on the unemployment hazard due to policy implications.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Unemployment Spells
Homeowners Renters
Survival time (months)
25 percentile 2 2
50 percentile 5 7
75 percentile 13 19
Exits from unemployment (percent)
Full-time 93.2 92.9
Part-time 6.8 7.1
Total spells ending in employment 80.3 73.5
Distribution of number of spells (percent)
1 57.5 60.1
2 21.8 22
3 9.9 9.5
4 4.7 4.5
>4 6.1 3.9
Spell [Exits] 1134[911] 1943[1428]
Individuals 709 1189
Observations (person-spell) 1134 1943
Note: Author’s calculation.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Homeowners Renters
Age (%)
25–30 16.58 26.45
31–35 13.14 16.11
36–40 18.87 19.92
41–45 17.72 14.51
46–50 16.67 12.45
51–55 17.02 10.55
Education (%)
Elementary 0.06 0.10
Apprenticeship 0.30 0.32
High-school 0.49 0.44
College 0.15 0.14
Partner (%)
Single 0.25 0.30
Employed partner 0.54 0.43
Unemployed partner 0.21 0.28
Children (%)
0-12 0.31 0.35
13-18 0.26 0.17
Non-labor income (Real Euros)
Partner’s wage 15,974 13,841
Public Transfers 7,486 7,061
* Means are taken over the spells.
Note: Author’s calculation.
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Table 2.3: Homeownership Rates by State, 1990–2011
State Mean Standard Deviation
Baden-Wu¨erttemberg 54.51 2.17
Bavaria 53.35 1.70
Berlin** 11.24 3.05
Brandenburg* 40.05 4.12
Bremen 36.71 9.18
Hamburg 20.02 4.11
Hessen 45.57 3.33
Lower Saxony 40.69 7.14
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania* 54.94 2.84
North Rhine-Westphalia 42.47 3.25
Rhineland-Palatinate 55.91 2.61
Saarland 61.95 7.49
Saxony* 33.67 5.25
Saxony-Anhalt* 41.56 5.58
Schleswig-Holstein 57.11 4.27
Thuringia* 45.09 3.64
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel
* State was part of the Former German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
** Berlin was dived between East and West Germany.
Note: Author’s calculation.
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Table 2.4: Homeownership Rates by State From Microcensus
State 1998 2002 2006 2010
Baden-Wu¨erttemberg 48.3 49.3 49.1 52.8
Bavaria 47.6 48.9 46.4 51.0
Berlin 11.0 12.7 14.1 14.9
Brandenburg 35.5 39.8 39.6 46.2
Bremen 37.5 35.1 35.4 37.2
Hamburg 20.3 21.9 20.2 22.6
Hessen 43.3 44.7 44.3 47.3
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 32.2 35.9 33.2 37.0
Lower Saxony 48.9 51.0 49.0 54.5
North Rhine-Westphalia 37.4 39.0 38.7 43.0
Rhineland-Palatinate 55.0 55.7 54.3 58.0
Saarland 58.1 56.9 54.9 63.7
Saxony 28.7 31.0 29.5 33.7
Saxony-Anhalt 36.5 39.6 37.9 42.7
Schleswig-Holstein 46.8 49.4 47.1 49.7
Thu¨ringia 39.2 41.8 40.6 45.5
Germany 40.9 42.6 41.6 45.7
Source: German Microcensus
61
Table 2.5: Estimates of the Unemployment Hazard and Homeownership Choice without Unobserved
Heterogeneity
Variable
Unemployment Hazard Homeownership Choice
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Homeowner .122 .050 – –
State Homeownership Rate - - 2.738 .439
Age .064 .008 −.134 .016
Age2 −.001 .0003 .002 .0002
Education
Apprenticeship −.046 .097 .173 .163
High school −.127 .095 .455 .159
College or Higher −.058 .109 .374 .181
Partner
Employed Partner .153 .091 .405 .149
Unemployed Partner .212 .073 −.171 .120
Non-labor Income
Public Transfer −.031 .012 .020 .019
Partner’s Income .014 .008 −.025 .013
Labor Market Tightness −2.131 .432 −2.600 .834
ln(L) −1330.3 −1926.0
Individuals 1898
Observations 3077
Note: Estimating the model without correction for selection into homeownership is equivalent to estimating
the unemployment and homeownership models separately. The unemployment model is specified as Cox
duration model, while the homeownership model is logit. The standard errors are clustered at individual
level to account for the presence of multiple spells per individual. Estimate of the baseline are not reported.
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Table 2.6: Main Estimation Results with Exclusion Restriction
Variable
Unemployment Hazard Homeownership Choice
Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI
Homeowner −.832 −2.460 −.464 – – –
Homeownership Rate – – – 1.923 −.096 2.700
Unobserved Effects
νu 2.775 .331 4.350
νh 1.960 .457 4.500
Corr(νu, νh) .069 .007 .130
Support Points
pi1 .300 .133 .718
pi2 .115 .002 .302
pi3 .056 .001 .295
pi4 .529 .329 .789
Log 3258.15
Individuals 1898
Observations (person-spell) 3077
Note: Estimation is performed using simulated annealing, global optimization technique, in R with package
GenSA. I reported 95% CI are biased-corrected intervals as described in Efron and Tibshirani (1986) because
standard inferences that rely on asymptotic properties is not appropriate due to skewness in the empirical
distribution of the estimators. The standard error for the correlation coefficient is calculated based on 1000
draws from the multivariate normal distribution with mean and covariance matrix set to the estimated
parameter vector and covariance matrix.
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Figure 2.1: Unemployment Survivor Functions by Homeownership Status
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Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: The survivor functions are calculated using the Kaplan-Meier estimator. The Peto-Peto-Prentice rank test of
equality between survivor functions yields p=0.001.
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Figure 2.2: Homeownership Trends by State, 1990–2012
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Source: Author’s calculations using the GSOEP.
Note: Individual data for Saarland is only available from 2000 in the GSOEP.
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Figure 2.3: Empirical Distribution of Homeownership Estimate
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Note: The empirical distribution of the homeownership estimate is obtained via kernel estimator. The solid vertical
line represents point estimate, while the dash-point vertical lines represent 95% bias-corrected confidence interval
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1986).
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Chapter 3
Convergence in Unemployment
Duration and Its Determinants
Between East and West Germans:
Is the Berlin Wall Gone?
3.1 Introduction
All Eastern European countries with Communist pasts underwent economic and institutional
transitions during which unemployment soared, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was
no exception to this rule despite institutional and financial help from the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, later referred to as West Germany. In the former GDR, later referred to as East Germany,
unemployment rate for all civilians in labor force was 15 percent in 1994, rising to an all-time high
of 19 percent in 2005, and then falling to about 10 percent in 20141. High and persistent unem-
ployment rates are detrimental for long-run labor market outcomes such as wages, future spells of
unemployment, crime rates, and health outcomes (Ruhm, 1991; Hamilton, Merrigan and Dufresne,
1The initial effect of German unification on the East German labor market was a dramatic fall in employment,
which declined by 35 percent between 1989 and 1992, according to official statistics of the Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit
(the Federal Employment Agency).
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1997; Raphael and Ebmer, 2001; Arulampalam, 2001; Mroz and Savage, 2006). Hence, it is im-
portant to understand the differences in duration of unemployment and its determinants between
Eastern and Western Germans after unification and how these differences evolve over time for labor
market policies. In this paper, I study how duration of unemployment and its determinants related
to age, gender, education, and family are different between Eastern and Western Germans after
unification, and how these differences evolve over time.
The strengths of this study are in examining the longer time period after unification and
distinguishing between unemployed individuals “in” and “out” of the labor force. Hunt (2004), for
example, uses the 1990–1999 period and finds persistent differences in duration of non-employment
between East and West Germany, and a weak convergence in the role of determinants of non-
employment durations. Because economic transition involves changes of both formal and informal
institutions, a longer time horizon is essential for assessing the transition. Thus, I use the period
1990–2012 to study East German transition. Furthermore, in this study, I differentiate between
unemployed individuals “in” or “out” of the labor force. It is important to differentiate between
the two types of unemployment, since these two unemployment states are behaviorally distinct.
During the early days of unification, the majority of unemployed Easterners involuntary transitioned
from employment to unemployment, which means that they are behaviorally more comparable to
unemployed West Germans “in” the labor force than those “out” of the labor force.2 Thus, to make
more accurate comparisons of differences in duration and its determinants between East and West, I
investigate unemployment spells of individuals 18–55 whom I observe transitioning from employment
to unemployment.
Despite the financial assistance and “know-how” help, East Germany received in the process
of setting up institutions, the unemployment rate in East Germany was consistently high. Previous
literature attributes the lethargic performance of the unemployment rate in East Germany to market
distortions, policy interference, and high adjustment costs (von Hagen and Strauch, 1999; Snower
and Merkl, 2006; Burda, 2006). Others argue that the Western labor unions’ assistance to the
Eastern labor unions in wage negotiation led to the fast growth of wages during early unification,
which ultimately acted as a wage floor (Sinn and Sinn, 1992; Siebert et al., 1991; Link, 1993; Lange
2The East German labor force participation rate was 10 percentage points higher than West German rate for
workers 16–65 (Bonin and Zimmermann, 2001, pp.18). The difference in the labor force participation rates was
even larger between females, 75.7 percent in East Germany compared to 55 percent in West Germany (Bonin and
Zimmermann, 2001, pp.19).
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and Paugh, 1998). Zimmermann (1993) and Vogler-Ludwig (1997) argue that supply-side factors,
such as high female labor force participation, are a major reasosn for high unemployment in East
Germany.
In addition, literature points at the long-lasting effects of Communist institutions on eco-
nomic outcomes. For example, Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007) show the evidence of commu-
nism having effects on not only outcomes, but also economic preferences in Germany. In addition,
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Masella (2016) find that an additional year of socialist education substantially
decreases the probability of obtaining a college degree and adversely affects labor market outcomes
such as employment, working hours, and wages, even 15 years after the collapse of the East Germany.
In section 3.2, I provide an in-depth review on the effects of East-West unification on the German
labor market and the key labor market developments over the last 28 years.
In Section 3.3, I summarize information about the dataset, and examine changes in unem-
ployment duration and its determinants over time. I use the German Socio-Economic Panel from
1990 until 2012 to study unemployment duration and its determinants. I narrow my sample down
to individuals who are 18–55 years old and whom I observe transitioning from employment to un-
employment. These individuals are more likely to reflect the behavior of the unemployed “in” the
labor force. I also separate unemployment into three groups by spell’s origination time: 1990–1995,
1996–2003, and 2003–2012. I separate these spells using two important milestones: i.) ending of
privatization of publicly owned enterprises in East (1995), and ii.) beginning of labor market reforms
(2002).
Comparing composition of these samples across determinants and time periods shows that
there are differences between East and West Germans regardless of gender. For example, unemployed
East females are more educated, less likely to be married, and less likely to have children that are
infants than West females during the period 1990–1995. Similarly, I find that East males are older,
better educated and more likely to be married than their West counterparts. I find that over time
differences in the composition of the samples between East and West Germans diminish.
Furthermore, a comparison of unemployment duration shows that East Germans remain in
unemployment for a shorter time than West Germans, especially during long spells of unemploy-
ment. For example, there are no differences in median duration of unemployment between East
and West males regardless of the time period, while I find that East males have six months shorter
unemployment duration at the 75th percentile of unemployment duration. Similarly, I find that East
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females’ median duration is about one month shorter regardless of time period, and that they have
nine months shorter unemployment duration at 75th percentile. Interestingly, both East and West
females spend less time in unemployment during later time periods while the East-West difference
persists, i.e.the West female unemployment spells are shortening but the East females still have
shorter spells.
In Section 3.4, I develop an econometrics framework to analyze the roles of age, gender,
education, and family in unemployment duration, and asses how the effects of these detriments on
unemployment duration change over time. I use the panel logit estimator to estimate the effects of
determinants on unemployment duration as described by Kiefer (1988) and Sueyoshi (1991). This
model is more appropriate than the Proportion Cox Model, given the grouped nature of my data,
i.e. when exits from unemployment are observed or recorded at aggregated time intervals such as
weeks or months.
In Section 3.4.3, I summarize the effects of the role of determinants on unemployment
duration, and how these effects change over time. I find that the role of the determinants changes
over time for East Germans, both males and females, and West females, while the effects do not
change significantly for West males. Furthermore, I find that the effects of the determinants are
significantly different across East and West Germans. My results show that initially education and
age have the largest disproportional effect on unemployment lengths of East and West Germans.
I also find that the role of education in the determining unemployment duration experiences the
largest change over time in East Germany, followed by the role of age. During the early period after
unification, education plays no role in the East unemployment duration of both genders, which is
not surprising since the East economy was in total disarray after unification. Education becomes an
important determinant of the hazard function in later periods for Eastern Germans. Additionally, I
find the emergence of the educational differentials between East and West Germans with education
being significantly more important in reducing unemployment duration for East Germans.Finally, I
find that the role of children and relationship with a partner plays a similar role in unemployment
duration since unification.
My findings contribute to the literature on the long-lasting effects of Communist institutions
on economic outcomes and to the literature which explains persistently high unemployment rates in
East Germany during the 1990s and early 2000s. Unlike Hunt (2004), I show that the differences in
unemployment duration and its determinants exist during the initial period of transition but these
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differences shrink over time. My findings suggest that the effects of Communist institutions and
transition at least do not persist in the duration of unemployment and its determinants between
East and West. Furthermore, I show that the role of age, education, children, and relationship status
are not drivers of the differences in unemployment in the late 1990s and 2000s. Finally, in Section
3.5, I present some final remarks with potential questions for further research.
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3.2 German Unification and Labor Market
East and West Germany entered monetary, economic, and social union on 1st July 1990. At
the time of unification, the East German population was 20 percent of unified Germany; in terms
of area, the East makes up 30 percent of all Germany; and the East’s pre-unification GNP was 15
percent of the combined total (Sinn and Sinn, 1992, pp.22)3. East Germany had poor infrastructure
compared to the West, outdated Soviet technology, non-existing free-market institutions, and lack
of experience with prices and markets. For example, 70 percent of the housing stock had been
constructed before World War II, more than twice the proportion in the West. The East’s indus-
trial production was dirtier than in West Germany or in some Eastern European countrie; sulfur
dioxide emission per capita was 7 times higher than West Germany. In comparison to the Eastern
European Communist countries, sulfur dioxide emission per capita were 50 percent worst than in
Czechoslovakia and 100 percent worse than in Hungary and Poland. About a thousand of districts
did not have access to drinkable water, and a third of the industrial wastewater was untreated when
it left plants. Chemical contamination was reaching extremely high levels; up to 50,000 industrial
sites were polluted by chemicals. In terms of capital stock, 50 percent of it was obsolete, and no less
than 67 percent would have been written off under Western accounting rules4.
The Western institutions, including the systems of justice, regulations, industrial relations,
banking, education, social security, and welfare were set in place after unification, and only a small
number of institutions were subject to the gradual introduction. For example, property rights over
public firms were resolved by the end of 1995 through privatization. Unification brought institutional
shock that caused a sharp drop in Eastern GDP and employment; East GDP fell by 30 percent and
employment fell by 35 percent between 1989 and 1992. In the years after 1992, the East’s economy
began with rapid growth; the ratio of Eastern to Western GDP per capita grew from 49 to 66 percent
between 1992 and 1995.5 However,the ratio of Eastern to Western GDP per capita stagnated around
66 percent during 1996–2004, indicating the East’s economy had reached a plateau. The driving
component of growth was financial aid coming from West Germany which was mainly spent on
infrastructure and welfare. From 1990 to 2015, this assistance accumulated to about USD 2 trillion,
and today this assistance is around USD 80 billion per year (Gehler, 2011).
3Assuming 1:1 exchange rate.
4The statistics on conditions of housing stock, pollution, and capital stock in East Germany are from Sinn and
Sinn (1992).
5The GDP statistics are obtained from Statistische A¨mter Bundes und der La¨nder.
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The East labor market went through turbulent phases especially during the early years of
transition. The employment to population ratio fell by 17 percent between 1990 and 1992, and it was
65 percent compared to 73 percent in West Germany in 1999. Examining the unemployment rate in
East Germany (excluding East Berlin) indicates a similar trend as GDP statistics. The rate increased
from 10 percent to 19 percent between 1991 and 1995, where it remained until 2006. The lack of
search requirements for the registered unemployed is partly responsible for the high unemployment
rates. However, these rates would probably be higher if there were no early retirement program
during the early days of unification or active labor policies such as retraining or public work. The
active labor policies have decreased unemployment rates since the participants of these programs
would have been unemployed had they not taken early retirement or entered retraining programs
and public works.
For example, the temporary early retirement program allowed individuals 55 or older to
retire with Western-level benefits, and the number of retirees peaked at 854,000 in 1993. The public
works jobs peaked at 388,000 in 1992 and remained around 300,000 until 1998. The retraining
programs peaked at 372,000 in 1992 and declined to 147,000 by 1998. The portion of the labor force
involved in the programs peaked at 18 percent in 1992 and fell to 7.5 percent in 19986.
In the rest of this section, I discuss the events that contributed to the weak performance of
the East labor market during unification’s early period and the effects of labor reforms known as
Hartz I–IV that were implemented in the early 2000s. These were the events that contributed to the
weak performance of the labor market during 1990-2004: aggregate demand shocks, the one-for-one
exchange rate between Ostmarks and the Deutschmarks, wage hikes induced by unions, privatization
of public firms, and social welfare. The reasons behind the sharp drop in East GDP and employment
in the early years of transition are attributed to a large fall in aggregate demand shock caused by
the removal of price controls, substitution of the Eastern goods with the Western, and the collapse
of trading arrangements with the former Communist Eastern European countries. From 2002 until
2004, the German labor market went through the Hartz I–IV reforms with the aim of decreasing
structural (long-term) unemployment.
In the East Germany, wages rose fast after unification especially from 1990 to 1993 because
of the assistance Eastern unions received from Western unions in negotiation with managers of public
6The unemployment and employment rates are from the Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit. Statistics on the programs for
unemployed and early retirement are from Sachversta¨ndigenrat various years.
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firms, who did not have any incentive to resist wage hikes. These wages acted as a wage floor and are
considered to be the single most important factor that caused the fall in East German employment
(Sinn and Sinn, 1992; Akerlof et al., 1991). After unification, West unions feared that there would
be a large migration of workers from East to West, and as a result, helped East unions negotiate high
wages. The data from the German Socio-Economic Panel indicates that the median real monthly
wage for workers 18–55 rose 83 percent between 1990 and 1993 in East Germany. The growth in
wages considerably slowed down after 1993. In 1993, the East-West ratio of nominal monthly wage
was at 71 percent, and the ratio in 1999 was only 76 percent.
As already mentioned, a part of the reason behind the fast rise in wages were the lack of
property rights over firms during the early years of transition. By the end of 1992, the majority
of small firms were privatized, while the large industrial firms were privatized by the end of 1995.
There were 8,500 large firms with 44,000 plants and 45 percent of the workforce (Carlin, 1994).
Unprofitable firms and plants were closed while the remaining firms were sold mainly to the Western
firms that were in the same industry (Dyck, 1997). The Western firms obtained 74 percent, the
Eastern individuals 20 percent, and the foreign firms obtained 6 percent of Eastern firms when
weighted by employment (Carlin, 1994). Despite the increase in unemployment in the early days of
transition, in general, privatization is considered to be successful because it promoted employment
in the medium and in the long run.
von Hagen and Strauch (1999) pointed at the welfare system as a reason for high unem-
ployment in East Germany in the medium run and the long run. Indeed, prior to 2003 and Hartz
reforms unemployed individuals would receive between 60 percent and 67 percent of the previous
income for up to 32 months depending on age. Following the expiration of unemployment benefits,
the individual would receive unemployment assistance between 53 percent and 57 percent of the
previous income indefinitely. An individual was also qualified for welfare benefits, means-tested
benefits, to ensure decent living conditions. These benefits were 70 percent of the lowest wage in
the industrial sector, and 100 percent of the lowest wage in low-paid sectors. Besides the generous
unemployment benefits, individuals were not incentivized to search for jobs because there were no
search requirements. Thus, the generous welfare system increased the reservation wages, which in
turn raised the duration of unemployment.7
Hartz reforms were enacted in stages: Hartz I and II in January 2003, Hartz III in January
7The facts about the German unemployment benefits originate from Gaskarth (2014).
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2004, and Hartz IV in January 2005. The primary goal of these labor supply-side reforms was
reducing structural (long-term) unemployment in Germany through reorganization of the Federal
Labor Offices, promotion of part-time jobs and self-employment, the introduction of penalties if
individuals rejected a reasonable offer to work, and reduction of long-term unemployment benefits.
Among these reforms, the reduction of long-term unemployment benefits was probably the most
important since the old system of benefits was replaced with a flat-rate benefit of 359 euros a month
(not including rent). Nagl and Weber (2014) find that hazard rates increased by 24 percent after
reform and that the effect is more prominent in East Germany than West Germany. Their results
also indicate that Hartz reforms were more beneficial to short-term unemployed rather than the
long-term unemployed individuals.
Although the Eastern labor market and income levels have not yet converged to the Western,
it is reasonable to expect that the East labor market will resemble the West labor market quite closely
in the long run. There are no geographical barriers or significant differences between East and West
Germany; East Germany is not behind in terms of education; the two regions share the same language
and similar culture; and there are no differences in the formal institutional framework; there are
no restrictions on the mobility of labor or capital. Given the facts about the institutions, there
is no reason to believe that income levels will not converge as well as the behavior of unemployed
individuals in the labor market.
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3.3 Differences in Unemployment Duration and Its Determi-
nants Between East and West Germans
3.3.1 Data Description
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is a representative annual panel survey of
households and individuals. It began collecting survey data in 1984 in West Germany, and East
Germany was included in 1990. The main advantages of these data are the ability to identify
whether the individuals are East or West German, a large array of socio-economic variables, and
the panel structure which allows following individuals through their employment biographies. The
survey identifies an individual’s residence during 1989 just before unification, which is how I defer
between East and West Germans.
The calendar section of the panel follows an individual’s labor status during the 12 months
prior to the year of survey. In the calendar section of the GSOEP, individual chose among the
following categories of labor status: full-time employed, short-work hours, part-time employed,
vocational training, unemployed, retired, maternity leave, school or college, military or community
service, housewife or husband, second job, other, first job–training (apprenticeship), continuing
education (retraining), and mini–job (up to EUR 400).
The survey does not limit the number of labor statuses during each month, so 70 percent
of the observations have multiple statuses. For example, an individual could declare to be in full-
time employment and at the same time to be a housewife (husband), or in vocational training and
an at the same time to be full-time employed during the same month. It is also possible to have
individuals declare being unemployed and full time employed during the same month. I resolve
this issue of multiple statuses during each month by sorting employment statuses and dropping
irrelevant statuses, so that each individual has a unique spell for each month. The employment
statuses dominate other statuses, while the observations with the conflicting statuses such as full–
time employed and unemployed during the same month are dropped from the analysis.
After establishing a unique labor status during each month for every individual, I keep only
unemployment spells for which I observe the starting date. This approach has two advantages: first,
the sample is more representative of unemployed persons since the individuals are more likely to be
searching for a job immediately after becoming unemployed; and second, I avoid making assumptions
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about durational dependence. This is very important since the force statuses of the unemployed “in”
and “out” of the labor force are behaviorally distinct (see: Heckamn and Flinn, 1983; Tano, 1991),
which means that studying their behavior jointly can produce misleading conclusions. Combining
the two unemployment states is even more problematic in the context of East German transition,
because the majority of Easterners went to unemployment involuntary after unification. Thus, East
German sample of unemployed individuals is more likely to have a greater portion of individuals
actively looking for jobs than West German sample, which means that such comparison is deemed
to find more persistent differences in the duration and determinants of unemployment.
My sample has 7,813 individuals: 3,116 are Easterners and 4,697 are Westerners. The
sample has 16,319 spells of which 6,755 are Eastern spells and 8,911 are Western spells (see Table
3.2). Thus, on average Easterners have 2.2 spells and Westerners 1.9 spells during the period from
1990–2012. Because I am interested in the effect of transition on the duration of unemployment
and its determinants, I divided spells into three groups by time of spell origination: 1990–1995,
1996–2002, and 2003–2012. These periods were chosen according to two important milestones in
the German labor market. First, privatization of public enterprises in East Germany ended in 1995;
thus, the period 1990–1995 is an era of institutional adjustment. Second, in 2002, Germany began
overhauling its welfare system related to unemployment and both parts of Germany were equally
affected by these changes.
In the sample, it is possible for an individual to have multiple spells of unemployment over
this period of 22 years. Table 3.1 summarizes the number of individuals by type of spells. Table
differentiates between individuals who had one spell of unemployment and those with multiple spells
of unemployment in different periods. Approximately 30 percent of East Germans and 23 percent
of West Germans have multiple spells of unemployment. Furthermore, approximately 76 percent of
East Germans and 80 percent of West Germans with multiple spells experience unemployment in
adjacent periods.
3.3.2 Differences in Unemployment Determinants and Their Evolution
over Time
In Tables 3.3 and 3.4, I present averages of the following unemployment determinants: age,
level of education, the presence of children, the status of a relationship with a partner, and the
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distance from the closest metropolitan area by gender for East and West. All determinants are
time-invariant binary variables except for the time-varying indicators for the presence of a child in
the family.
The indicators of age at which women enter unemployment, in Table 3.3, show that the
largest share of female unemployment spells occurs during ages 26–35 regardless of origin. I also
observe that Western females are 13.6 percentage points more likely to be in unemployment during
age 26–35 than Eastern females during 1990–1995. This differential falls over time and in the period
2003–2012 is only two percent. In the last period, 2003–2012, Eastern females are nine percentage
points more likely to be in unemployment during age 18–25 while they are 11 percentage points
less likely to be unemployed in the age group 36–45 than their Western equivalents. Hence, there is
convergence in the composition of unemployment spells by age between females.
Furthermore, both Eastern and Western females have either apprenticeship or vocational
education in approximately 82 percent of unemployment spells during 1990–1995. Eastern females
with higher education are 7.8 percentage points more likely to have a spell of unemployment than
comparable Western females during 1990–1995. In 2003–2012, the share of spells of females, both
Eastern and Western, with an apprenticeship or vocational education falls by approximately 13
percentage points, while there is a rise in the share of female spells with higher education, six
percentage points in the East and ten percentage points in the West. Also, the East-West female
differential in the share of spells with higher education falls to four percent in 2003–2012. Thus, the
differences in education level between East and West females during unemployment spells fall over
time.
Examining the differences in relationship status during unemployment spells in the 1990–
1995 period indicates that: i.) Eastern females are five and seven percentage points more likely
to be unemployed while single or while in cohabitation than comparable Western females; and ii.)
Eastern females are 11 percentage points less likely to be married while in unemployment. In the
2003–2012 period, these differences increase. For example, Eastern females are 11 and 15 percentage
points more likely to be single or in cohabitation than comparable Western females. Also, Eastern
females are 23 percentage points less likely to be married while in unemployment. Although the
East-West female differential in relationship status is increasing over time, the general trend is that
both East and West females are more likely to be single or in cohabitation while unemployed.
There is at least one child ages 0–6 in 42 and 65 percent of East and West female unemploy-
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ment spells during 1990–1995. This differential is almost completely eliminated for unemployment
spells that originated during 2003–2012. Examining this trend over time indicates an increase in the
share of spells with a child of ages 0–1 in the East by about 18 percentage points, while in the West
it remains approximately the same. In contrast, the share of spells with a child of ages 2–6 does not
change in East while it falls by seven percentage points in the West over time.
Finally, there is no significant differences between East and West females in regards to
the location of living, measured as a distance in kilometers from a city center. Furthermore, it is
important to note that there is an increase in the number of East females living in the West German
states over time by around 11 percentage points. In conclusion, while there are some differences
in the determinants of unemployment duration between East and West females during the initial
period, these differences fall over time. I also note that the role of children and relationship status
are changing over time in both East and West.
In Table 3.4, East males ages 26–35 make up 30 percent of unemployment spells while other
age groups make up the rest of unemployment spells in approximately the same amount during the
1990-1995 period. In contrast, during the same period, Western males less than 25 years old make
up 40 percent of unemployment spells, while Western males ages 26–35 are in 31 percent of spells.
These differences between East and West males disappear in 2003–2012 period. Moreover, Eastern
males are eight percentage points less likely to be in the age group 36–45 and 8 percentage points
more likely to be in the age group 46–55 than their Western equivalents during the 2003–2012 period.
Thus, both East and West males are more likely to be in unemployment if older than 36.
In 76 percent of unemployment spells, both East and West males had either apprenticeship
or vocational education during the period 1990–1995. East males in 16 percent of unemployment
spells have a higher education, while West males have only 5 percent during the same period. In the
period 2003–2012, East males with an apprenticeship or vocational education make up 86 percent
of unemployment spells, i.e. an increase of 10 percentage points from the 1990–1995 period.In
contrast, the share of Western males with apprenticeship or vocational education did not change in
later periods. Interestingly, East males with higher education account for approximately 6 percent of
unemployment spells, a fall of 10 percentage points compared to the 1990–1995 period. At the same
time, West males with higher education make up 11 percent of unemployment spells, an increase
of six percentage points compared to the 1990–1995 period. Thus, there is a slight divergence in
education composition of unemployment spells between East and West males.
79
During the 1990–1995 period, married East males account for 57 percent of spells followed
by single East males with 32 percent of spells. In contrast, married Western males make up only
35 percent of total spells while single West males make up about 50 percent of total unemployment
spells during the same period. In the period 2003–2012, the share of married East males fell by
22 percentage points, while the share of single East males and the share of those in cohabitation
increased by approximately 11 percentage points each. In contrast, the share of married West males
and the share of West males cohabiting increased by 4.6 and 2.7 percentage points from 1990–1995,
while the share of single West males decreased by 7.3 percentage points compared to 1990–1995.
Thus, there is convergence in the composition of the samples in terms of relationship status with a
partner between East and West males.
In 42 and 31 percent of unemployment spells, East and West males had a child present in
the household during 1990–1995. There was a decrease in the presence of children in the household
for both East and West unemployed males by 20 and 4 percentage points, respectively during 2003–
2012. For both East and West males, this fall came because of a decrease in the shares of spells
where a child is 2–6 years old and 7–11 years old. Thus, there is convergence in the make up of
unemployment spells with respect to the presence of children in the household. Finally, I want to
note that no clear pattern exists in differences in terms of location of living measured as a distance
to a city center between East and West males. Additionally, between 91 and 97 percent of East
males live in the former GDR East depending on the period while approximately 98 percent of West
males live in the former FRG .
To summarize, the determinants of unemployment duration for the most part suggest con-
vergence, i.e. composition of East and West unemployment spells looks more similar over time.
The composition of unemployment spells for East and West Germans in 2002–2013 is much more
similar than in 1990–1995 by age, education, relationship status, and the presence of children in the
household.
3.3.3 Convergence in Unemployment Duration between Eastern and West-
ern Germans
In this section, I examine the differences in unemployment duration using percentiles and
unconditional probability of leaving unemployment. Table 3.2, columns 1–3, shows the estimates of
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unemployment duration for 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles over the three periods for the Easterners.
In the same table, columns 4–6 present the same information for the Westerners. In addition,
columns 7–8 show estimates of unemployment duration for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile
during the 1990–2012 period. During 1990–1995, there are no differences in the 25th percentile of
unemployment duration between East and West Germans, while the median and 75th percentile
durations are lower for Eastern Germans regardless of gender. This suggests that the Easterners
return to work faster than the Westerners. Comparing the median and 75th percentile for East
and West Germans within gender over time shows that unemployment length is falling in both
the East and West, as well as convergence in the duration of unemployment. These preliminary
statistics of unemployment duration suggest that the unemployment durations between Easterners
and Westerners are more alike than different.
Furthermore, using the Kaplan-Meier estimator, the Wilcoxon (Breslow-Gehan), the Tarone-
Ware, and the Log-rank test statistics, I examine differences in unconditional probability of leaving
unemployment in East and West Germany over time. Figure 3.1 presents survivor functions by
gender for the Easterners and Westerners for 1990–2012. Irrespective of whether I look at East or
West, female survivor functions are higher than male survivor functions, i.e. females are less likely
to return to employment at any duration. All three tests at the 10 percent level show no significant
differences in the survivor functions between East and West males. In the case of female survivor
functions, the Log-rank and the Wilcoxon test imply that female survivor functions are significantly
different at a 6 percent level.
Pooling spells together ignores the effects of changes in institutions over time and assumes
that spells beginning immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall are the same as the spells that
began in the late 2000s. To better understand the changes in unemployment duration, I estimate the
unconditional probability of leaving unemployment for East and West Germans for the spells that
originated in 1990–1995, 1996–2002, and 2003–2012, separately. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 plot survival
functions with respect to the time spells originated for males and females separately.
Figure 3.2 indicates that female survivor functions are falling over time in both the East
and West. All three tests reject the joint hypothesis of female survivor functions being the same at
1 percent level within both the East and West. The estimates of the median and 75th percentile
durations drop by five months and 13 months respectively for Eastern females, while the same
estimates drop by 5 months and 18 months for the Western females (see Table 3.2). Comparing
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East to West female survivor functions for each period shows that the largest difference was during
the 1990–1995 period when the Log-rank and the Tarone-Ware tests reject the null hypothesis at
1 percent confidence level. The differences between Eastern and Western female survivor function
falls over time while these differences rename significantly different.
Figure 3.3 shows that the East male survival functions do not change for shorter durations
of unemployment, but the functions increase for longer durations over time. The figure also shows
that the West male survivor functions are falling over time for shorter spells. The Tarone-Ware
test fails to reject the hypothesis that these survivor functions are changing over time for both the
East and West. The Log-rank and Tarone-Ware tests suggest that there are significant differences
between East and West male survivor functions at 7 percent confidence level for spells originating
during 1990–1995, and fail to reject hypothesis for other periods. Thus, differences between male
survivor functions disappear over time.
In summary, East Germans stay shorter in unemployment than West Germans, and the
difference is especially drastic at longer lengths of unemployment. Furthermore, I find that for
both East and West Germans the unemployment duration is falling over time, which indicates
some evidence for convergence in unemployment duration. I find interesting developments with the
differences in unemployment duration between the East and West females. The differences between
East and West females survivor functions are not falling in the expected directions with East survival
functions becoming more like the West; but rather, I find that the Western female survivor functions
are falling towards Eastern female survivor functions.
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3.4 Convergence in the Role of Unemployment Determinants
3.4.1 Econometrics Model
In this section, I present the econometric models used to estimate the effects of the determi-
nants on unemployment duration and to assess the evolution of these effects on unemployment dura-
tion. I use the Discrete-Time Binary Choice model, a binary response model for discrete (grouped)
duration (Kiefer, 1988; Sueyoshi,1991), rather than the Cox Proportional Model (Cox, 1972). The
Discrete-Time Binary Choice model is more appropriate for the discrete (grouped) data and it is
less computationally demanding when modeling unobserved heterogeneity.
When it comes to modeling the effects of determinants on the duration of unemployment, a
common practice is to use the Cox Proportional Model (CPM). Although the CPM is a reasonable
compromise between the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator and structural parametric models,
using the CPM with grouped data will produce asymptotic bias in point estimates and standard
errors (Cox and Oakes, 1984, pp.99; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980, pp.75). Modeling heterogeneity
in the CPM model is computationally intensive, and the model restricts the effects of the explanatory
variables to be proportional through the progression of unemployment spells. The proportional
hazard assumption fails if either the effect of explanatory variables is non-proportional, or if there
is unobserved heterogeneity causing the effects of explanatory variables to depend on duration.
Grouped data in survival analysis occur when failure times are observed or recorded at
aggregated time intervals such as weeks or months. In my case, a labor status of an individual is
aggregated at a monthly level, so the duration of the event of interest is in discrete units. This
implies that there are ties in data especially for shorter spells of unemployment. The literature
deals with this problem by approximating exact marginal likelihood (see Breslow, 1974; and Efron
1977Efron). The Breslow method is inaccurate in cases where there are heavy ties, so the method
leads to an increasing asymptotic bias of parameter estimates (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978; Hsieh
(1995), 1995). The Efron method is more accurate than Breslow, but in the presence of the large
amount of ties remains inaccurate.
In each discrete time interval, two outcomes are possible: the spell either ends or it does not.
Let duration of unemployment follow a positive continuous random variable T . Each individual spell
of unemployment is grouped at monthly level tj , j = 1...J , i.e. I observe the number of months an
individual is unemployed. Conditional on an individual remaining unemployed up to the beginning
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of interval tj−1 and the set of observable determinants of unemployment, X(tj−1), the discrete
probability that the individual’s unemployment spell ends in a given time interval [tj−1, tj) where
j = 1...J , is given by
λd(tj |X) = Pr [tj−1 ≤ T < tj |T ≥ tj−1, X(tj−1)] . (3.1)
Hence, the probability that an individual stays unemployed beyond tj is
Sd(tj |X) = Pr[T ≥ tj−1|X] =
j−1∏
k=1
(1− λd(tk|X)). (3.2)
The discrete-time hazard in (3.1) is the probability of leaving unemployment in [tj−1, tj), and (3.1)
can be restated using survivor functions, S(.), as
λd(tj |X) = S(tj−1|X)− S(tj |X))
S(tj−1|X) . (3.3)
Within each interval S(t|X) = exp(− ∫ t
t−1 λ(s)ds), and after simplifying (3.3) I obtain
λd(tj |X) = 1− exp
(
−
∫ t
t−1
λ(s)ds
)
. (3.4)
Since with the discrete data S(t) is evaluated at t = tj , (3.4) can be written as
λd(tj |X) = G (γ (tj) +X (tj−1)β) . (3.5)
G(.) is a distribution function that ensures 0 6 λij 6 1 for all i, j, while γ(tj) is a function of
interval time that allows hazard rate to vary across periods. γ(tj) can be approximated with a set of
dummy variables, or with a flexible functional form. The determinants of unemployment duration
are either time variant or time invariant.
If each individual leaves unemployment spell during jth interval [tJ−1, tJ), then the like-
lihood function will have two parts: the first part is the contribution of the individual i being
unemployed tJ−1 months, and the second part is the contribution of the individual i leaving the
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unemployment spell before tJ ends, so the likelihood function is
L =
N∏
i=1
Ji−1∏
j=1
(
1− λdij(X(tj−1))
)λdiJ(X(tJ−1)). (3.6)
The likelihood equation (3.6) does not take into account the presence of either censoring or
multiple spells. Estimating (3.6) consistently requires that censoring is non-informative of Ti, that
it occurs at boundaries, and that spells are independent. Since the goal of this study is to examine
the behavior of the unemployed, i.e. those who are available for work and actively searching for jobs,
I only concentrate on the individuals from whom I can observe the transition from employment to
unemployment. For left-censored spells, I cannot distinguish whether an individual is unemployed
or out of the labor force, so I do not consider those spells. From an empirical point of view, the left
censored spells should be disregarded in order to avoid any restrictive a priori assumptions about
the duration dependence of the hazard rate. On the other hand, right censored spells are not an
issue in estimation because I do not need to make assumptions about the duration dependence of
the hazard rate. Keeping the right censored spells also implies that I am implicitly assuming that
individuals with right censored spells remain in the labor force, i.e. they are continuing to search for
a job.
Taking into account presence of the right censored spells requires modification of the like-
lihood function in (3.6). Let δij be an indicator function such that δij = 0 if the individual left an
unemployment spell during [tj−1, tj), and 0 otherwise. Then (3.6) can be written as follows:
L =
N∏
i=1
 Ji∏
j=1
(
1− λdij(X(tj−1))
)1−δijλdiJ(X(tJ−1))δij . (3.7)
Clearly, the only difference between equations (3.6) and (3.7) is in cases of right censored spells
where contribution to likelihood function is only made by the first term of likelihood. The likelihood
functions in (3.6) and (3.7) are equivalent to likelihood function for a binary panel regression model
with dependent variable δij .
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3.4.2 Estimation
Estimating the likelihood function (3.7) requires assumptions for the functional form of the
hazard rate, λdij , and for the functional form for the baseline, γj(t). The most common functional
specifications of hazard function are the normal, logistic and extreme-value minimum distribution,
which yield a probit, logit, and cloglog model. In my estimation, I assume logistic distribution
and estimate panel-logit model8. Baseline, γj(t), is assumed to be a cubic function unemployment
duration. In addition, I include binary variables for federal states and binary variables for years to
account for any state-time specific effects that might be correlated with determinants. Because of
multiple spells per individual, I use the Huber Sandwich Estimator to obtain conditional indepen-
dence between spells.
3.4.3 Results
Firstly, I examine the effects of determinants on the duration of unemployment between
East and West Germany by estimating a model where the effects of the covariates including the
grouped baseline vary across four groups: East, West, male, and female. For all pairs, I test if the
joint effect of the determinants of unemployment is the same across these four groups. The results
show that the effects of covariates are significantly different across groups at one percent confidence
level for all pairs, which is why I perform separate regressions for East, West, females, and males9.
Secondly, I test for each group separately if the effects of covariates on the duration of
unemployment are the same across three different periods: 1990–1995 , 1996–2002, and 2003–2012.
For each group, under the null hypothesis, i.e. the effects of covariates are the same across three
periods, I estimate a model in which there is an interaction between binary variables for the period
in question and the covariates including the baseline. I find that the effects of covariates across time
periods are different or both the East and the West females at 10 percent and 1 percent, respectively.
The results for males are mixed because I find evidence of determinants of unemployment being
significantly different across the time periods for East males and lack of the same evidence for West
males9. Hence, I present the results across the time periods for females and East males separately,
8Assuming the normal, logistic and extreme-value minimum distribution produces similar results, but these three
distributions differ in the type of proportional effects covariates have on the hazard. Sueyoshi (1991) shows that the
probit model generates non-proportional effects of the variables on discrete hazard while the logit and cloglog model
tend to show only slight non-proportionality because derivatives of the log discrete hazard differ substantially between
these distributions.
9These results are available upon request.
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while I pool three periods for the West males.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 summarize the effects of unemployment determinants on hazard rates in
terms of odds ratios by gender for each period. In Table 3.5, columns 1–3 and columns 4–6 report
the effects of the determinants on the Eastern and the Western females’ hazard rates for the three
periods: 1990–1995, 1996–2002, and 2003–2012. In Table 3.6, columns 1–3 summarize the effects of
unemployment determinants on the Eastern males for the same periods, while column 4 reports the
effects on the Western males for the period 1990–2012.
Comparing the coefficients on age groups for East females between 1990–1995 and 2003–
2012 periods (columns 1 and 3 in Table 3.5) shows that East females older than 36 years entering
unemployment in the period 2003–2012 have lower odds of leaving unemployment than comparable
females in the period 1990–1995. In contrast, West females in all age groups have higher odds of
leaving unemployment if they entered unemployment in the period 2003–2012 as opposed to 1990–
1995, columns 4 and 6 in Table 3.5. A comparison between East and West females during the
period 2003–2012 suggests that West females are more likely to leave unemployment if older than
36. Hence, there is a divergence in the role of age in unemployment hazards between East and West
females.
In Table 3.5, for the East, I find that education was not important for the hazard rate
during the 1990–1995 and 1996–2002 periods. This is somewhat expected since all the industries
and sectors were affected by the initial shock from unification, while the recovery was slow during
the medium run. However, in the latest period, the individuals with at least a vocational education
have 2.4 times higher odds of leaving unemployment than those who did not complete their degrees,
the omitted group. In contrast, education is an important determinant in the West regardless of
period and the effect of education on West female hazards is roughly constant over time. Comparing
the coefficients between the East and the West for the period 2003–2012 indicates that education
has a higher impact on the hazard rate in the East. These results indicate that there is convergence
in the role of education in unemployment duration between East and West females. In addition, the
results indicate the emergence of an educational differential in the hazard rate between East and
West females with education being more important for East females.
Examining the role of children’s age and relationship status in Table 3.5 shows that i.)
infants lower odds of leaving unemployment for both East and West females regardless of the period;
ii.) East females with an infant entering unemployment during 2003–2012 have lower odds of leaving
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unemployment than comparable East females in 1990–1995; iii.) West females with a child age 2–6
have lower odds of leaving unemployment in the period 2003–2012 than they did in 1990–1995;
iv.) children older than seven years seem to be unimportant for the duration of unemployment for
both East and West females regardless of time period. On the other hand, I find that the role
of relationship status in unemployment duration of East and West females is similar and does not
change over time. Thus, there is evidence of divergence in the role of children, in particular the
role of infants, in unemployment duration between East and West females with West females having
higher odds of leaving unemployment in the presence of infants.
In Table 3.6, I find that age becomes an important determinant of unemployment duration
over time. In the 1990–1995 period, only East male ages 46–55 have 0.76 times lower odds of leaving
unemployment than the youngest group, 18–25. In contrast, East males that enter unemployment
in the period 2003–2012 and are older than 36 have lower odds of leaving unemployment than
younger males. In contrast to East males, only West males older than 46 have lower odds of leaving
unemployment compared to the youngest group. Thus, these findings suggest a slight divergence in
the role of the age in unemployment duration and emergence of age differential between East and
West males in the age group 36–45.
Furthermore, I find that education for East males is a statistically an unimportant determi-
nant of unemployment duration during spells that originate in the 1990–1995 period . This changes
over time, and education become an important determinant for spells originating in 2003–2012. For
example, East males with a vocational degree, general secondary education, and higher education
have approximately 2.5, 3.3, and 2.8 folds higher odds of leaving unemployment than East males
with only primary education, respectively. The educational level is also more important in East male
unemployment hazards for the period 2003–2012 than for West male unemployment hazard. For
example, East males with vocational or general secondary education are 1.1 and 1.7 times more likely
to leave unemployment than West males. Thus, as with females, I find that there is convergence in
the role of education in unemployment length, but at the same time, there is a rise in educational
differential between East and West German males.
I find that the role of children have no significant role in determining unemployment duration
for both East and West males. On the other hand, I find that relationship status is an important
determinant of unemployment hazards. In particular, I find that married East males have 1.4
higher odds of leaving unemployment than single East males during the 1990–1995 period. Further,
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I find that marriage becomes even more important in the period 2003-2012. There is a similar
relationship for married ad single West males, but West married males have 0.3 times lower odds of
leaving unemployment]than East married males. I also find that the effect of cohabitation on the
unemployment duration is similar for East males between the 1990–1995 and 2003–2012 periods,
as well as that the effect of cohabitation is not significantly different than a comparable effect for
West males. Thus, these findings suggest that the role of a partner in unemployment hazards of
East and West males is similar, and that it was not different during the transition. Finally, I find no
significant pattern in the role of the residence on unemployment hazards of East and West Germans.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate whether there are differences in duration of unemployment and
its determinants related to age, education, children, marriage between East and West Germans, and
how the role of these determinants changes over time. The German Socio-Economic Panel data allows
me to distinguish between East and West Germans based on the residence before unification. I use
data from 1990 until 2012 to assess developments in unemployment duration and its determinants.
The results show the existence of differences in the duration of unemployment between the
Easterns and Westerns regardless of gender immediately after unification. During the early days of
transition, unemployment lengths are shorter in the East than the West, especially for longer spells
of unemployment, but these differences disappear for males and significantly decrease for females. I
find that the female unemployment length is falling over time in both the East and West, indicating
higher attachment to employment. The interesting finding about durations is that the Western
female unemployment duration is approaching the Eastern female’s duration. This result might
come as a surprise at first, but it can be explained by changes in the unemployment benefits.
In regards to determinants of unemployment, I find that their role is changing over time for
East German and West German females. Further, I find initial differences in the role of age and
education in unemployment duration for both males and females. For both males and females in
East, I find that the role of education in the hazard function experiences the largest change over
time, from being unimportant determinant to being the most important followed by the role of age.
Furthermore, I find the emergence of the educational differentials between East and West Germans
with education having stronger effects on unemployment duration for East Germans. I do not find
any significant differences in the roles of children and the relationship with a partner in determining
the length of unemployment between East and West, regardless of gender. Therefore, the findings in
this paper suggest that there is convergence in the duration of unemployment and its determinants
between East and West Germans. Furthermore, this research can be extended to examine if East
Germans are more likely to switch occupations when leaving unemployment spells.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Unemployment Spell Types
East West
Male Female Male Female
Single spell
1990–1995 310 431 320 512
1996–2002 337 268 414 667
2003–2012 377 454 662 1016
Multiple spell
1990–1995 and 1996–2002 111 176 72 211
1996–2002 and 2003–2012 197 236 187 415
1990–1995 and 2003–2012 19 42 24 58
All three periods 68 90 30 109
Total 1419 1697 1709 2988
Note: The first three rows summarize the number of individuals who only had one spell of unemployment
between 1990–2012. The second three rows summarize the number of individuals who had multiple spells
across periods.
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Table 3.5: Estimates of the Effect of Unemployment Determinants on Female Unemployment Hazard
East West
1990–1995 1996–2002 2003–2012 1990–1995 1996–2002 2003–2012
Age
26–35 0.87 0.67* 1.00 0.87 1.01 0.79*
(0.71) (0.20) (47.71) (0.55) (8.35) (0.30)
36–45 0.80*** 0.56* 0.58* 0.64* 0.94 0.75*
(0.48) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (1.46) (0.24)
46–55 0.60* 0.38* 0.54* 0.51* 0.52* 0.63*
(0.20) (0.07) (0.15) (0.12) (0.10) (0.16)
Education
Apprenticeship 0.82 1.27 1.46 1.34 2.10* 1.44
(0.67) (2.69) (1.11) (1.38) (0.48) (0.96)
Vocational Education 1.03 1.51 2.41* 1.66*** 2.40* 1.84**
(5.64) (1.81) (0.74) (1.00) (0.49) (0.76)
General Secondary Edu. 1.00 2.14 2.83* 1.90** 2.52* 1.92**
(48.30) (1.41) (0.78) (0.96) (0.51) (0.75)
Higher Education 1.64** 2.14 2.96* 2.71** 3.13* 2.54*
(0.66) (1.41) (0.77) (1.24) (0.53) (0.68)
Children’s Age
0–1 0.30* 0.27* 0.22* 0.30* 0.36* 0.30*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
2–6 0.87 0.82** 0.89 1.04 0.96 0.79*
(0.63) (0.49) (0.72) (4.77) (1.63) (0.25)
7–11 0.85* 0.81* 0.89 1.28* 1.05 1.04
(0.49) (0.43) (0.94) (0.49) (1.93) (2.07)
Partner’s Status
Married 1.21*** 1.06 1.06 0.99 0.87*** 1.01
(0.69) (2.22) (2.01) (8.22) (0.48) (10.64)
Cohabitation 0.98 1.00 1.12 1.12 0.92 1.31*
(5.24) (735.29) (1.19) (1.24) (1.10) (0.46)
Distance to City
≤ 10km 1.03 0.93 1.08 1.16 0.84 0.99
(3.52) (1.96) (2.08) (1.06) (0.52) (11.47)
10–25km 0.98 0.89 1.06 1.07 0.90 0.85
(5.20) (1.06) (2.93) (2.17) (0.95) (0.60)
25–40km 1.11 0.79 1.10 0.92 0.83 0.94
(1.48) (0.52) (1.98) (1.72) (0.55) (2.10)
40–60km 1.05 0.70** 1.18 0.98 0.87 1.07
(2.89) (0.33) (1.23) (7.07) (0.84) (2.35)
≥60km 1.30*** 0.79 0.93 0.85 0.90 1.09
(0.73) (0.55) (2.07) (0.91) (1.24) (1.63)
ln(L) −3659.6429 −3890.5203 −3829.0465 −4183.9119 −6646.7389 −7161.1392
Observations 24,736 22,954 16,976 35,569 42,615 35,396
Individuals 739 770 822 889 1,401 1,598
Note: Estimates are obtained using the panel logit estimator. Odds ratios are reported with standard errors clustered
at individual levels due to multiple spells per individual. All regressions include year and state dummies. Determinants
are time-invariant within spells, except for childrens’ variables, which are time-variant. Significance levels: 1% *, 5%
** ,and 10% ***.
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Table 3.6: Estimates of the Effect of Unemployment Determinants on Male Unemployment Hazard
East West
1990–1995 1996–2002 2003–2012 1990–2012
Age 0.90 0.64* 1.00 1.03
26–35 (1.19) (0.15) (75.68) (2.20)
0.96 0.57* 0.77** 0.90
36–45 (3.41) (0.11) (0.38) (0.70)
0.73** 0.43* 0.56* 0.51*
46–55 (0.42) (0.06) (0.13) (0.07)
Education
Apprenticeship 1.07 1.64*** 1.41 1.34**
(3.59) (0.86) (1.56) (0.64)
Vocational Education 1.07 1.98* 2.47** 1.37**
(3.56) (0.75) (1.02) (0.61)
General Secondary Edu. 0.78 2.02** 3.31* 1.61***
(1.13) (0.82) (1.06) (0.51)
Higher Education 0.91 2.20* 2.81* 2.15***
(2.36) (0.77) (1.08) (0.44)
Children’s Age
0–1 1.03 0.86 0.90 1.05
(5.19) (0.97) (1.35) (2.24)
2–6 1.03 1.04 0.82 0.78***
(4.21) (2.98) (0.54) (0.28)
7–11 0.99 0.95 0.86 0.92
(8.81) (1.94) (0.92) (1.06)
Partner’s Status
Married 1.43* 1.66* 1.62* 1.40*
(0.55) (0.34) (0.38) (0.31)
Cohabitation 1.35 1.22 1.22 1.30*
(0.73) (0.61) (0.70) (0.38)
Distance to City
≤10km 1.45** 0.91 1.32 0.99
(0.64) (1.34) (0.85) (6.96)
10–25km 1.59* 1.09 1.61** 1.20**
(0.53) (1.66) (0.62) (0.57)
25–40km 1.19 1.23 1.43** 1.20*
(1.03) (0.81) (0.71) (0.63)
40–60km 1.29 1.01 1.22 1.16
(0.83) (11.33) (1.20) (0.93)
≥60km 1.34 1.02 1.12 1.20
(0.88) (7.60) (1.82) (0.74)
ln(L) -2300.24 -3447.92 -3183.25 -8344.79
Observations 8,075 14,084 12,064 31,433
Individuals 508 712 661 1,709
Note: Estimates are obtained using the panel logit estimator. Odds ratios are reported with standard errors clustered
at individual levels due to multiple spells per individual. All regressions include year and state dummies. Determinants
are time-invariant within spells, except for childrens’ variables, which are time-variant. Significance levels: 1% *, 5%
** ,and 10% ***.
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Figure 3.1: Survival functions, 1990-2010
Note: The survivor functions are calculated using the Kaplan–Meier estimator. The Log-rank and the
Wilcoxon test of equality between East and West female survivor functions yields p=0.05 while I find no significant
differences between East and West male survivor functions.
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Figure 3.2: Female unemployment survival functions by location
Note: The survivor functions are calculated using the Kaplan–Meier estimator. Testing equality of survivor
functions within East and West over time shows that they are significantly different at 1 percent level. Comparing
East to West female survivor functions for each period shows that largest difference was during the 1990–1995 period
when the Log-rank and the Tarone-Ware tests reject the null hypothesis at 1 percent confidence level. The differences
between East and West female survivor function fall over time while renaming significantly different.
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Figure 3.3: Male unemployment survival functions by location
Note: The survivor functions are calculated using the Kaplan–Meier estimator. The Tarone-Ware test fails
to reject the hypothesis that these survivor functions are changing over time within East and West. The Log-rank test
and the Tarone-Ware suggest that there are significant differences between East and West male survivor functions at
7 percent confidence level for spells originating during 1990–1995, and the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis for
other periods.
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Table 7: Robustness: Estimation Results without Exclusion Restriction
Variable Coeff. 95% CI
Homeowner .275 −.048 1.034
Unobserved Effects
νu 3.054 −1.804 4.971
νh 1.765 .627 1.977
Corr(νu, νh) -.001 −.0454 .078
Support Points
pi1 .048 .003 .04
pi2 0.79 .002 .125
pi3 .289 .274 .723
pi4 .583 .473 .75
Log 3251.2
Individuals 1898
Observations (person-spell) 3077
Note: Estimation is performed using simulated annealing, global optimization technique, in R with package
GenSA. I reported 95% CI are biased-corrected intervals that are calculated as described in Efron and
Tibshirani (1986) because standard inference that relays on asymptotic properties is not appropriate due to
skewness in empirical distribution of the estimate. The 95% CI for the correlation coefficient is calculated
based on 1000 draws from the multivariate normal distribution with mean and covariance matrix set to the
estimated parameter vector and covariance matrix.
Appendix A Model without exclusion restrictions
Alternative estimation methodology to exclusion variable, primary methodology in this paper is to exploit
availability of multiple unemployment spells per person in which there is intra-person variation in homeownership
status. Munch et al. (2006) use this methodology in their paper. Unfortunately, I only observe four percent of
individuals who were homeowners and renters. Given the small variation in the intra-person homeownership status,
the identification strategy with exclusion restriction is preferred, but I also estimate the model using intra-person
variation of homeownership status as an identification strategy for the completeness. In Table 7, I present the
estimates of the model that corrects for the presence of self-selection into homeownership by using intra-person
variation in homeownership status. The coefficient on homeownership status indicates that homeowners have 31
percent (=exp(0.275)−1) higher rates of exit from unemployment than renters but the 95% biased-corrected confidence
interval is between −.048 and 1.304 . The difference between the coefficients on homeownership in the model without
correction and with correction for self-selection indicates the presence of negative correlation between unobserved
effects such that unobserved characteristics that make men more likely to be homeowners also have negative impacts
on the transition out of unemployment. The estimate of correlation between the unobserved effects is −0.001 and this
is statistically significant. Although the intra-person variation of homeownership status is not a viable identification
strategy in this situation, the estimates of correlation between unobserved effects indicate the need to correct for
self-selection when estimating the effects of homeownership on exits out of unemployment.
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Table 8: Main Estimation Results with Exclusion Restriction: Full Results
Variable
Unemployment Hazard Homeownership Choice
Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI
Homeowner −.832 −2.460 −.464 – – –
Homeownership Rate – – – 1.923 −.096 2.7
Age .038 −.034 .06 −.199 −.251 −.145
Age2 −.001 −.001 0 .003 .002 .004
Education
Apprenticeship .130 −.165 .639 .349 −.296 1.303
High school −.011 −.326 1.02 .700 .052 1.788
College or Higher .065 −.315 .726 .551 −.123 1.541
Partner
Employed Partner .250 −.29 .701 .321 −.379 .751
Unemployed Partner .250 −.453 .547 −.321 −.904 .044
Non−labor Income
Public Transfer −.061 −.119 −.019 .016 −.041 .067
Partner’s income .035 −.005 .087 −.023 −.059 .025
Labor Market Tightness −3.774 −4.95 −1.462 −1.389 −2.55 .894
Unobserved Effects
νu 2.775 .331 4.35
νh 1.960 .457 4.5
Corr(νu, νh) .069 .007 .13
Support Points
pi1 .300 .133 .718
pi2 .115 .002 .302
pi3 .056 .001 .295
pi4 .529 .329 .789
Log 3258.145
Individuals 1898
Observations 3077
Note: Estimation is performed using simulated annealing, global optimization technique, in R with package
GenSA. I reported 95% CI are biased-corrected intervals as described in Efron and Tibshirani (1986) because
standard inferences that rely on asymptotic properties is not appropriate due to skewness in the empirical
distribution of the estimators. The standard error for the correlation coefficient is calculated based on 1000
draws from the multivariate normal distribution with mean and covariance matrix set to the estimated
parameter vector and covariance matrix.
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